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I. INTRODUCTION
Why is the prosecution arm doing this .. .?
This Article examines a generally unremarked process that is
transforming American criminal law-the move from a "simple" to a
"compound" model of liability. The essential difference between the two
models is that simple liability makes each act one-and only one-crime,
whereas compound liability lets an act sustain liability for multiple
offenses.2
Compound liability began appearing in federal law more than a
century ago, but rapidly accelerated the pace of its infiltration after
Congress adopted the "Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organiza-
tions" and the "Continuing Criminal Enterprise" statutes in 1970.' Until
then, compound liability was a matter of common law; RICO and CCE
were the first statutes explicitly incorporating it.' For almost a
decade, prosecutors avoided RICO and CCE because of their peculiar
liability structures; but they eventually learned to use them, and by the last
decade of the twentieth century, compound liability has become a routine
feature of federal law and has made serious inroads at the state level as
well.5
As many have noted, often critically, federal law's embrace of
compound liability increased the number of federal prosecutions and the
Letter from Sam Adam, Chicago defense attorney, CHICAGO LAWYER, July 1991, at
13.
2 See Susan W. Brenner, S.C.A.R.F.A.C.E.: A Speculation on Compound Criminal
Liability and Double Jeopardy, 27 NEW ENG. L. REV. 916, 929-37 (1993). See also infra
part II.A.
3 The former is commonly known as "RICO," the latter as "CCE". The origins and
provisions of both statutes are discussed infra part II.B.
4 See infra part II.A-B.
5 See, e.g., Edward S.G. Dennis, Jr., Current RICO Policies of the Department of
Justice, 43 VAND. L. REV. 651, 652-53 (1990). See infra pait II.D. for the present status
of compound liability in state and federal law.
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complexity of criminal charges.6 Prosecutors may have reason to regard
this phenomenon with satisfaction,7 but others share the frustration
expressed by a noted Chicago defense attorney:
Thirty years ago I began my practice trying prostitution
cases at 1121 S. State Street. Presently, I am engaged in a
multi-defendant, multi-count RICO conspiracy trial .. . in
which the bulk of the indictment consists of 30-some
prostitution counts, all under the umbrella of a RICO
conspiracy. What would have been an hour or two trial in
the state court is now a month or more federal prosecu-
tion .... All to what end?
8
While the empirical effects of this shift receive a great deal of
attention, its conceptual implications have almost escaped notice.9 This
Article explores that neglected issue, examining American law's
attachment to compound liability and the effect this has on traditional
precepts of criminal law. Section II explains the nature of compound
liability and traces its rise in American law. Section III attempts to account
for its success to date and speculates about the future of compound
liability. Section IV serves as a brief conclusion.
II. COMPOUND LIABILITY: AN OVERVIEW
The configuration of the charges-including the use together
of RICO and CCE and drug conspiracy and numerous
substantive counts . . . gave the prosecution a hard-ball
edge. 10
This section compares simple and compound liability and traces the
latter's recent success in American law at both the federal and state levels.
It also analyzes the distinguishing characteristics of compound liability.
6 See, e.g., Paul Marcus, Criminal Conspiracy Law: Time to Turn Back from An Ever
Expanding, Ever More Troubling Area, 1 WM. & MARY BILL OF RTS. J. 1 (1992); Gerard
E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & 11, 87 COLUM. L. REV. 661
(1987); Gerard E. Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, 87
COLUM. L. REV. 920 (1987); Craig M. Bradley, Racketeering and the Federalization of
Crime, 22 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 213 (1984).
' See infra part III.
8 Adam, supra note 1, at 13.
9 But see Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being Criminal, Parts III & IV, supra note 6,
at 84.
"0 United States v. Williams-Davis, 821 F. Supp. 727, 755 (D.D.C. 1993).
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A. Two Models of Criminal Liability
Historically, Anglo-American criminal law implicitly assumed that an
act constituted the commission of one and only one crime.1' For centuries,
this seldom articulated assumption structured the conceptualization of
"crime," as in Blackstone's statement that a crime is "an act committed
... in violation of a public law." 1 2 It produced the notion that the goals
of the criminal law could be achieved by enunciating a single prohibi-
tion-or "crime"-for each undesirable act. 3
Unchallenged, this ancient assumption remained anonymous; 4 but the
recent success of a rival assumption which rejects its correlation of
exclusion between act and crime requires a nomenclature to distinguish the
two approaches. This Article will, therefore, use "simple liability" to
denote the traditional one act-one crime model and "compound liability"
to designate the model that lets one act serve as the predicate for multiple
offenses. 15
The taxonomy comes from grammar, which classifies sentences
according to their structure.' 6 A simple sentence contains one independent
" See Brenner, supra note 2, at 917-19. See generally Frank E. Horack, Jr., The
Multiple Consequences of a Single Criminal Act, 21 MINN. L. REV. 805, 814-18 (1937).
References to an "act" denote that all the elements traditionally needed for liability-act,
mens rea, causation, and resulting harm, if required-are present. See, e.g., WAYNE R.
LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTTI, JR., CRIMINAL LAW §§ 3.1-3.12 (2d ed. 1986).
12 4. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *5. See also WILLIAM L. CLARK,
HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW § 1 (2d ed. 1902) (stating that a crime is an "act which
the law forbids"); 1 FRANCIS WHARTON, TREATISE ON CRIMINAL LAW § 14 (8th ed.,
Philadelphia, Kay & Brother 1880) (stating that a crime is an act "in violation of public
law").
13 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 919:
Since the goal was to discourage certain conduct by defining it as unacceptable, the
architects of the law of crimes supposed that it was sufficient to articulate one such
definition for each undesirable behavior. The operative premise was that a definition
sufficed because it provided a means for sanctioning those who engaged in that
conduct. In a correlative undertaking, the criminal law sought to establish
appropriate punishments for each offense; the theory was that identifying behavior
as a crime would accomplish the goals of the criminal law as long as an adequate
punishment was prescribed and administered for engaging in that behavior.
14 Id. at 917-23.
'5 See generally id. at 916.
16 See, e.g., DIANA HACKER, THE BEDFORD HANDBOOK FOR WRITERS 463-64 (3d ed.
1991). Four sentence structures exist-simple, compound, complex, and compound-
complex. Id. at 463. The text following this note defines the first two structures. A
"complex" sentence is a simple sentence that includes a subordinate clause-a word
pattern that "cannot stand alone as a complete sentence." Id. at 464. A "compound-
complex" sentence is a compound sentence that includes one or more subordinate
clauses. Id. at 465.
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clause-a subject, verb, and perhaps, an object. It can include multiple
subjects and/or verbs, but cannot incorporate more than one independent
clause.17 A compound sentence, on the other hand, contains at least two
independent clauses. The compound sentence is, in other words, an
aggregate composed of simple sentences.'"
This useful dichotomy captures each model's distinctive approach to
criminal liability: the simple model regards it as a categorical phenomenon,
and therefore assumes an exclusive correlative relationship between act and
offense. 9 Postulating that any act warrants the imposition of but one
quantum of liability, this model encompasses a single determination-
"liability" or "no liability." The simple model's limited analysis
reflects its origins in archaic justice systems which employed literal, often
draconian, penalties that made iterative liability irrelevant.20
The simple model has existed since criminal law began as the rough
justice of the lex talionis, which demanded "life for life, eye for eye,
tooth for tooth, hand for hand, foot for foot, bum for bum, wound for
wound, stripe for stripe."' 21 In such a system, a "liability/no liability"
repertoire suffices because a finding of "no liability" requires no action,
while a finding of "liability" triggers the imposition of punishment which
is considered to be commensurate with the harm resulting from the crime
" Id. at 464 (stating that a simple sentence is composed of "one independent clause
with no subordinate clauses"). An "independent clause" can stand alone as a full
sentence, i.e., "contains a subject and verb plus any objects, complements, and modifiers
of that verb." Id.
18 Id. ("A compound sentence is composed of two or more independent clauses with
no subordinate clauses."). This terminology has not been used to designate models of
criminal liability, but grammatical terms have been used to describe the structure of
offenses such as RICO and CCE. See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084,
1109 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2010 (1991) (referring to "compound-
complex felonies such as RICO"). See generally Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684,
709 (1980) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (referring to compound and predicate offenses).
9 That is, it assumes that an act constitutes only one offense. See supra note 13 and
accompanying text.
20 At one point in English history, for example, felonies were capital crimes, so a
determination of liability effectively eliminated the system's need to devote further
consideration to that offender. See Horack, supra note 11, at 819; 3 JAMES F. STEPHEN,
A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 75-76 (London, MacMillan 1883). For
other English punishments, see BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at *377. For the sometimes
literal, generally harsh punishments imposed in medieval Europe, see ANDREW MCCALL,
THE MEDIEVAL UNDERWORLD 54-81 (1979).
2 Exodus 21:25. See also Brenner, supra note 2, at 968-69. Anglo-Saxon law,
precursor to the common law that shaped American criminal law, included this principle.
See, e.g., THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNEITT, A CONCISE HISTORY OF THE COMMON LAW 425-26
(5th ed. 1956); 1 JAMES F. STEPHEN, A HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 57-
59 (London, MacMillan 1883).
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at issue.22 Since each offense is viewed as adequately addressing the evil
inherent in the conduct it prohibits, imposing liability is a matter of
matching conduct and crime and proving the former.23
Like a simple sentence, this version of criminal liability is a
categorical, not a permutable, phenomenon; liability either exists or it does
not, depending on the status of several basic elements. The simple model
suffices as long as criminal conduct is perceived as falling into a series of
discrete categories, each of which inflicts readily identifiable injury to
persons, to property, or to the state.24 In America, it persisted until the end
of the last century, when federal law began experimenting with a new
model.25 Like a compound sentence, this version of criminal liability is an
aggregate resulting from the combination of discrete elements.2 6 Unlike
simple liability, it lets an act or course of conduct serve as the factual
predicate for multiple offense liability.27
22 See supra note 13.
23 Because it equated "act" and "crime," the common law used two
principles-"merger" and "double jeopardy"-to preclude additive liability for one act.
See, e.g., 1 JOEL P. BISHOP, NEW COMMENTARIES ON THE CRIMINAL LAW UPON A LEGAL
SYSTEM OF EXPOSITION § 1060 (Chicago, T.H. Flood & Co. 1.892) (" '[O]ut of the same
facts a series of charges shall not be preferred.' " (quoting Regina v. Elrington, 9 Cox
C.C. 86, 90, 1 B. & S. 688)).
Merger barred cumulative liability for greater and lesser offenses, i.e., for a
misdemeanor and a felony. See JUSTIN MILLER, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL LAW 50 (1934)
("[I]f by the same act the defendant committed both a misdemeanor and a felony, the
misdemeanor was merged in the felony and the defendant was liable for the latter
alone."). It did not apply if the crimes were both misdemeanors or felonies. Id. See also
Berkowitz v. United States, 93 F. 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1899). The constitutional ban on
double jeopardy was, until recently, interpreted to fill this gap. See North Carolina v.
Pearce, 395 U.S. 711, 717 (1969) (finding that double jeopardy bars re-prosecution and
"multiple punishments for the same offense"); Ex parte Lange, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 163,
173 (1873) (finding that double jeopardy "prevent[s] the criminal from being twice
punished for the same offence"); See also Brenner, supra note 2, at 920-23.
Merger and double jeopardy have been attributed to the strictures of common law
criminal procedure. See Comment, Statutory Implementation of Double Jeopardy Clauses:
New Life for a Moribund Constitutional Guarantee, 65 YALE L.J. 339, 342-43 (1956);
MILLER, supra, at 51; see also Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 777 n.l 1 (1975)
("As the procedural distinctions diminished, the merger concept lost its force and
eventually disappeared.").
24 See generally Note, Twice in Jeopardy, 75 YALE L.J. 262, 279 (1965) (stating that
the common law "distinguished among rape, arson, and murder, but not between
'intimidating any person from voting' and 'interfering with his right to vote' "). See also
id. at 279 n.75 ("At the time of Henry III there were only eleven felonies. In Coke's
time the number had risen to thirty.").
25 See infra part II.B. (describing experimentation).




B. The Emergence of Compound Liability in American Law
Compound liability became a major influence on federal law in 1970,
with the adoption of RICO and CCE.28 The Supreme Court had, how-
ever, confronted common law compound liability issues on several
occasions in the nineteenth century.29 Though RICO and CCE were shaped




Despite simple liability's general dominance in the nineteenth
century,3' compound liability issues arose in three areas of federal law:
prosecution by different sovereigns, liability for continuing offenses, and
merging of greater and lesser offenses.
It became apparent early in the century that federal and state
authorities would, on occasion, seek to impose liability for the same
conduct. 32 Defendants confronted with this endeavor argued that it
produced a cumulative liability which violated the Fifth Amendment's
prohibition of double jeopardy.33 The Supreme Court upheld the practice,
thereby creating a noticeable anomaly in the prevailing "one act-one
crime" model of criminal liability.34 This anomaly facilitated the rise of
compound liability by acclimating judges and lawyers to the notion of
iterative liability for a single course of conduct.
35
28 See supra note 3 and accompanying text. See also infra part II.B.2.a.-b.
29 See infra part II.B.1.
30 See infra part II.B.2.
31 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 916-23.
32 See, e.g., Fox v. State of Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 410, 432 (1847); Houston v.
Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1, 32-33 (1820). It was not until late in the next century that
the Court upheld prosecutions by different states. See Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82
(1985).
33 The amendment provides that no one shall "be subject for the same offence to be
twice put in jeopardy of life and limb." U.S. CONST. amend. V. The rise of compound
liability has required the reevaluation of aspects of this provision. See Brenner, supra note
2, at 951-68.
'4 See, e.g., Moore v. State of Illinois, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 13, 16-17 (1852) (stating that
harboring fugitive slave violated both state and federal law-"[o]ne act constitutes two
distinct offences ... [which] may be separately tried, and ... punished"); accord United
States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922). Contra Fox v. State of Ohio, 46 U.S. (5 How.)
410, 439-40 (1847) (McLean, J., dissenting); Houston v. Moore, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 1,
72-74 (1820) (Story, J., dissenting).
35 See, e.g., United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922) ("[A]ct was an offense
against the state of ... Washington and also an offense against the United States.").
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The Court undercut compound liability by applying a common law rule
barring multiple liability for a "continuous offence. ' 3 6 In In re Snow, it
held that Snow could not be convicted of three "crimes of unlawful
cohabitation" for living with several women between 1883 and 1885
because "there was but one entire offense."37 Ironically, though, this
tenet of simple liability survives in some jurisdictions; 38 its concept of
a "continuing offense" became an integral component of RICO and
CCE.39
The nineteenth century Supreme Court's most important compound
liability decision involved the common law rule of merger, under which
a lesser crime-such as a misdemeanor-merged into a greater felony,
blocking convictions for both. 4° The question arose as to whether
conspiracy was encompassed by this rule, disappearing into a completed
substantive offense.4' At common law, conspiracy was a misdemeanor and
so merged into a completed felony.42 In Clune v. United States,43 the Court
held that conspiracy was "a separate offence" and could be punished as
36 See, e.g., Exparte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 186-90 (1889); In re Snow, 120 U.S. 274,
281 (1887). For the common law rule, see BISHOP, supra note 23, at § 793; WILLIAM L.
CLARK, HANDBOOK OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 324 (2d ed. 1918); WHARTON, supra note
12, at § 27.
" In re Snow, 120 U.S. at 285. Later, the Court retreated from this position. See, e.g.,
Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 302-03 (1932); Albrecht v. United States, 273
U.S. 1, 11 (1927); Morgan v. Devine, 237 U.S. 632, 639-41 (1915); Gavieres v. United
States, 220 U.S. 338, 342-43 (1911); Burton v. United States, 202 U.S. 344, 377 (1906);
Carter v. McClaughry, 183 U.S. 365, 394-95 (1902).
38 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(1)(e) (1985).
39 See infra part II.B.2.
40 See supra note 23.
41 Clune v. United States, 159 U.S. 590, 595 (1895). For an application of the rule, see
Hoyt v. People, 30 N.E. 315, 315 (1892) ("The conspiracy to bum is merged in the
consummated act of burning, [so liability exists for] arson only, and not conspiracy to
commit arson and arson.").
The traditional distinction between conspiracy and substantive crimes was based on the
proposition that the former required collective action while the latter did not. See United
States v. Cadwallader, 59 F. 677, 681-82 (W.D. Wis. 1893); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1597 (4th ed. 1968). But as modem law allows one to be convicted of conspiracy absent
either a consummated criminal agreement, or the prosecution and conviction of other
conspirators, it is more accurate to characterize the distinction as being based on the
premise that conspiracy involves at least the potential for concerted action. See, e.g.,
Marcus, supra note 6, at 21-25.
42 See Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587, 589 (1961); ROLLIN M. PERKINS &
RONALD N. BOYCE, CRIMINAL LAW 687-88 (3d ed. 1982). See generally Berkowitz v.
United States, 93 F. 452, 455 (3d Cir. 1899); United States v. Gardner, 42 F. 829, 830-31
(C.C.N.D.N.Y. 1890).
43 Clune, 159 U.S. at 590.
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such." After Clune, federal courts upheld compound liability for
conspiracy and for substantive crimes resulting from such an agreement, 5
though some expressed concerns about the resulting "duplication" of
liability.
46
The Supreme Court returned to this issue fifty years later in Pinkerton
v. United States, reiterating that a "substantive offense and a conspiracy
to commit it are separate and distinct. ' 47 But Pinkerton added a new
element, a "criminal agency" theory, that made conspirators liable for
substantive crimes that other conspirators committed to advance the goals
of their agreement.48
The Clune-Pinkerton line of cases established two propositions that
were crucial requisites for the advent of RICO and CCE. The first
proposition is that, unlike attempt, conspiracy is an offense independent of
any substantive crimes it generates. 49 By allowing liability to be imposed
44 Clune, 159 U.S. at 595. That the Court did not find it necessary to decide the
application of merger until 1895 illustrates the limited use of conspiracy in the nineteenth
century. The only prior decision addressing conspiracy as a distinct offense was Callan
v. Wilson, which held that it was a charge of sufficient gravity to require a jury trial. See
Callan v. Wilson, 127 U.S. 540, 556-57 (1887), (stating that conspiracy was not a "petty
offence[ I").
41 See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593, 619 (1927); United States v.
McElvain, 272 U.S. 633, 639 (1926); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 85-86
(1915); Heike v. United States, 227 U.S. 131, 144 (1913); United States v. Parrillo, 299
F. 714, 716, (3d Cir. 1924); Murry v. United States, 282 F. 617, 618 (8th Cir. 1922).
46 See, e.g., United States v. Parrillo, 299 F.2d 714, 716 (3d Cir. 1924) ("The effect
... is to make the penalty for the substantive offense greater than was contemplated by
Congress.").
47 Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640, 643 (1946).
48 Id. at 645. See also id. at 647-48 (stating that there was no liability if the act was
not "in furtherance of the conspiracy, did not fall within the scope of the unlawful
project, or was merely a part of the ramifications of the .plan which could not be
reasonably foreseen as a necessary or natural consequence of the unlawful agreement");
see also Susan W. Brenner, Of Complicity and Enterprise Criminality: Applying Pinkerton
Liability to RICO Actions, 56 Mo. L. REV. 931, 937-78 (1991).
49 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 941:
If Pinkerton had held that conspiracy merged into substantive offenses, as an
attempt merges into a completed crime, compound offenses would not have been
possible. Instead of imposing liability for the predicates and the resulting
"compound" offense, the latter could have been used only to enhance penalties,
letting prosecutors elect between multiple predicates or a compound offense carrying
greater penalties than a single predicate.
CCE was proposed as a penalty enhancer but became a separate offense due to
concerns about the constitutionality of the original approach. See H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91 st
Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970), reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4651, 4576; 116 CONG.
REC. 33,630-31 (1970) (remarks of Rep. Poff); 116 CONG. REC. 33,631 (1970) (remarks
of Rep. Eckhardt).
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for conspiracy and attendant substantive crimes, this sanctioned the
practice of compounding liability for a course of conduct in a prosecution
by one sovereign, a procedure that became increasingly common during
the twentieth century.
5 0
The other proposition was Pinkerton's theory of "criminal agency."51
This principle "contributed to the development of offenses such as RICO
and CCE because [it] introduced the idea that liability can derive from
involvement in a criminal nexus, as well as establishing that the act of
joining a conspiracy can support liability for multiple offenses. ' 52
2. RICO and CCE
For various reasons, America discovered "organized crime" in the
1950s and 1960s:53
We have always had forms of organized crime . ... But
there has grown up in our society today highly organized,
structured and formalized groups of criminal cartels, whose
existence transcends the crime known yesterday, for which
Unlike conspiracy, attempt and solicitation are regarded as preparatory steps that merge
into a completed offense. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07(4)(b) (1985).
" See, e.g., Phillip E. Johnson, The Unnecessary Crime of Conspiracy, 61 CAL. L.
REV. 1137 (1973); Marcus, supra note 6; Paul Marcus, Conspiracy: The Criminal
Agreement in Theory and in Practice, 65 GEO. L.J. 925 (1977); Note, Developments in
the Law--Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920 (1959); Francis B. Sayre, Criminal
Conspiracy, 35 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1922). In 1981, the Court upheld compound liability
for multiple conspiracy charges. See Albernaz v. United States, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981)
("[A] conspiracy to import drugs and to distribute them is twice as serious as a
conspiracy to do either object singly.").
Felony-murder was a common law compound offense. See Brenner, supra note 2, at
942; Nelson Roth & Scott Sundby, The Felony-Murder Rule: A Doctrine at Constitutional
Crossroads, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 446 (1985); see also BLACKSTONE, supra note 12, at
*200 (stating that "[i]f one intends to do another felony, and ... kills a man, this is ...
murder."); see infra note 96. Under the influence of the simple model, the Court first
held that merger barred liability for both the predicate felony and the resulting murder.
See Whalen v. United States, 445 U.S. 684, 693 (1980); Harris v. Oklahoma, 433 U.S.
682 (1977) (per curiam). See generally United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993)
(citing Harris). Subsequently, the Court upheld liability for predicates and a resulting
compound offense. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368 (1983).
5' See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
52 Brenner, supra note 2, at 942.
13 See, e.g., Bradley, supra note 6; Craig M. Bradley, Racketeers, Congress and the
Courts: An Analysis of RICO, 65 IOWA L. REV. 837 (1980); DONALD R. CRESSY, THEFT
OF THE NATION: THE STRUCTURES AND OPERATIONS OF ORGANIZED CRIME IN AMERICA
(1969); ESTES KEFAUVER, CRIME IN AMERICA (1951).
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our criminal laws ... were primarily designed .... These
hard-core groups ...present[] a unique challenge to the
administration of justice.54
Convinced of the existence of this peril and of its ability to avoid
prosecution under existing laws, Congress set about devising weapons that
could be used to eradicate organized crime.55 One of its goals was to create
offenses that could be used to prosecute continuing crime.56 Another was
to provide a means of attacking "criminal organizations."
a. RICO
Acting on the unverified assumption that organized crime was
equivalent to "racketeering," 8 Congress enacted the "Racketeer In-
fluenced and Corrupt Organizations" statute as Title IX of the Organized
Crime Control Act of 1970.59 Codified as 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968, RICO
was "to provide new weapons of unprecedented scope for an assault upon
organized crime. ' 6°
54 S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968 U.S.C.C.A.N.
2112, 2157.
15 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 70 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112, 2157 ("We inherited . . . a medieval system, devised . . . for a
stable, homogeneous, primarily agrarian community .... Ignored entirely ... was the
possibility of ... a phenomenon such as modem organized crime.").
56 See, e.g., S. REP. No. 1097, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. 163 (1968), reprinted in 1968
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2112 ("The investigation of crimes normally presupposes ... the 'crime
complete'. . . . The modem concern of many law enforcement agencies has been ...
crimes which are in a continuous process of commission.").
" See G. Robert Blakey, Foreword to Symposium: Law and the Continuing Enterprise:
Perspectives on RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 873, 874 (1991) ("Until . . .RICO,
organizations as such were seldom the focus of the law.").
58 See, e.g., PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED
CRIME TODAY 511 (1986) (stating that organized crime is an undefined concept). For its
origins, see Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, supra note 6, at
661.
" Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 901(a), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.)
941.
o See Act of Oct. 15, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-452, § 1, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.)
923, 941; United States v. Russello, 464 U.S. 16, 26 (1983). RICO has not been used
exclusively or even primarily against the Mafia or kindred groups. See G. Robert Blakey,
Foreword to Symposium: The 20th Anniversary of The Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act: Debunking RICO's Myriad Myths, 64 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 701, 709-10
(1990); G. Robert Blakey et al., Symposium: Law and the Continuing Enterprise: What's
Next? The Future of RICO, 65 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1073, 1080-81 (1990); Barry
Tarlow, RICO Revisited, 17 GA. L. REV. 291, 298-300 (1983).
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RICO targets "enterprise criminality"-crimes committed by, or in the
context of, an "enterprise. "61 Statutorily defined as an "individual,
partnership, corporation, association, . .. other legal entity," or "group
of individuals associated in fact, ' 62 enterprise has been construed as
comprising almost any form of organized activity.63 That construction has
been criticized as departing from the previously-noted concern with
traditional forms of organized crime, but it is defensible given that
Congress devised the concept of "enterprise" as a way to reach
continuing crime, an activity that is not restricted to the Mafia."4
6 G. Robert Blakey & Brian Gettings, Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations: Basic Concepts--Criminal and Civil Remedies, 53 TEMP. L.Q. 1009, 1021
n.71 (1980). For RICO's sanctions, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963 (1988) (stating that sanctions
include fines, imprisonment, and forfeiture); 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (1988) (enumerating civil
remedies).
62 18 U.S.C. § 1961(4) (1988). The definition states that enterprise "includes" these
entities. See Blakey & Gettings, supra note 61, at 1023 (stating that the code section
"works by illustration, not by limitation"). The enterprise must engage in, or its
activities affect, interstate or foreign commerce. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c) (1988).
63 See, e.g., Lynch, RICO: The Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, supra note
6, at 921 ("If two or three muggers ... form a loosely knit gang and can be shown to
have cooperated in two or more such robberies they have become . . . a RICO
enterprise.").
6' See supra note 56 and accompanying text. This use of enterprise was introduced in
an earlier anti-racketeering statute imposing compound liability-the Travel Act. See 18
U.S.C. § 1952(b)(i)(1) (1988). The Travel Act makes it a crime to travel in interstate or
foreign commerce or use the mail or any facility in interstate or foreign commerce
intending to (a) distribute the proceeds of unlawful activity, (b) commit a crime of
violence to further unlawful activity, or (c) otherwise promote unlawful activity. See 18
U.S.C. § 1952(a) (1988). It defines "unlawful activity" as "any business enterprise
involving" gambling, liquor, drug or prostitution offenses. See 18 U.S.C. § 1952(a)
(1988). It imposes compound liability in that one can be convicted of, and punished for,
both the Travel Act offense and the predicate crimes that constitute its "unlawful
activity." See, e.g., United States v. Stafford, 831 F.2d 1479, 1481-85 (9th Cir. 1987)
(offense distinct from its predicates because Travel Act "does not require the commission
of the predicate"). Accord United States v. Teplin, 775 F.2d 1261, 1265 (4th Cir. 1985);
United States v. Finazzo, 704 F.2d 300, 307-08 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 463 U.S.
1210 (1983).
The drafters of the Travel Act included "business enterprise" in its definition of
"unlawful activity" to ensure that the Act would not be used against "individual or
isolated violations." See H.R. REP. No. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in
1961 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664 (" 'Business enterprise' requires that the activity be a
continuous course of conduct"). See also Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on the
Judiciary: The Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and Racketeering,
87th Cong., 1st Sess. 16 (1961) ("continuous course of conduct" needed to constitute
"business enterprise"). Those who drafted RICO adopted the Travel Act's concept of
"enterprise" and expanded it as noted above. See, e.g., Lynch, RICO: The Crime of
Being a Criminal, Parts I & II, supra note 6, at 942-43; see also supra note 62 and
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In RICO, Congress created three substantive crimes and the crime of
RICO conspiracy.65 The substantive crimes require that a "person" use
the collection of unlawful debt, or a pattern of racketeering activity, to do
any of the following to an enterprise: 66 acquire or maintain an interest in,
or control of, it; establish it; operate it; and/or conduct or participate in
conducting its affairs.67 Very few RICO prosecutions charge that the
defendant manipulated an enterprise through the collection of unlawful
debt which resulted from illegal gambling or "loan-sharking. ' 68 Most
prosecutions allege that the defendant used a "pattern of racketeering
activity" against the enterprise.69
Engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity requires that one commit
"at least two acts of racketeering activity" within ten years. 70 "Racke-
teering activity" is committing any of a number of specified state and
federal offenses which are called "predicate offenses.' '7 To perpetrate a
accompanying text. See generally H.J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229,
243-49 (1989) (stating that RICO not limited to traditional organized crime); Sedima,
S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985) (stating that legitimate businesses
"enjoy neither an inherent incapacity for criminal activity nor immunity from its
consequences"). As RICO has evolved, its "pattern of racketeering activity" element
has become an additional device for ensuring that the statute is used only against
continuing crime. See, e.g., H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 243; Sedima, 473 U.S. at 497 n.14.
65 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
6 "Person" includes individuals or entities "capable of holding a legal or beneficial
interest in property." 18 U.S.C. § 1961(3) (1988). Again, the definition is illustrative, not
exhaustive. See supra note 62; Blakey & Gettings, supra note 61, at 1023.
67 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a) (1988) (using income from racketeering or collection of
unlawful debt to acquire interest in, establish, or operate enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(b)
(1988) (using racketeering or collection of unlawful debt to acquire or maintain interest
in or control of enterprise); 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (1988) (using racketeering or collection
of unlawful debt to conduct or participate in conducting enterprise).
68 18 U.S.C. § 1961(6) (1988) (defining unlawful debt as debt incurred in gambling
that was illegal under state or federal law "or which is unenforceable under State or
Federal law... because of the laws relating to usury"); see, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 60,
at 370-71.
69 See, e.g., Tarlow, supra note 60, at 370-71.
70 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5) (1988) (stating that the ten year period "exclud[es] any period
of imprisonment"). See also infra note 72.
7" See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(A) (1988) (specifying the state offenses); 18 U.S.C. §
1961(1)(B)-(E) (1988) (enumerating the federal offenses). See also Paul E. Coffey, The
Selection, Analysis, and Approval of Federal RICO Prosecutions, 65 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1035, 1036 (1990) (mentioning a prosecution which charged the defendant with
"fifty-two other federal statutes, five generic references to federal labor and securities
laws, and nine state offenses of murder, kidnapping, gambling, arson, robbery, bribery,
extortion, narcotics, and obscenity"). Conspiracy to commit certain predicates can also
serve as a RICO predicate. See United States v. Licavoli, 725 F.2d 1040, 1044-45 (6th
Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1985) (charging defendants with conspiracy to
1993]
WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL
substantive RICO offense, therefore, one must commit at least two
predicate offenses within ten years of each other and use this pattern of
racketeering activity against an enterprise in a way proscribed by 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(c).72
Prosecutors rarely allege substantive violations of § 1962(a) or
§ 1962(b). 73 Most substantive charges are brought under § 1962(c), which
makes it a crime to use a pattern of racketeering activity to conduct, or
participate in conducting, an enterprise's affairs.74 The next most widely-
used provision is § 1962(d), which prohibits conspiring to commit a
substantive RICO offense. 75 This offense is complete upon formation of the
agreement-no overt act is needed.76 Moreover, because Congress meant to
commit state predicates); Kronfeld v. First New Jersey Nat'l Bank, 638 F. Supp. 1454,
1472-73 (D.N.J. 1986) (charging conspiracy with an 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1)(D) (1988)
offense).
72 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. Substantive offenses based on collecting
unlawful debt have an analogous structure: the predicate offense is collecting debt
produced by usury or illegal gambling. See supra note 68 and accompanying text. The
RICO violation arises in using this activity to manipulate an enterprise in one of the ways
proscribed by 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988). See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has held that racketeering activity must exhibit "continuity plus
relationship" to constitute a "pattern." Sedima, S. P. R. L. v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S.
479, 496 n.14 (1985). "Relationship" requires that such activity have "the same or
similar purposes, results, participants, victims, or methods of commission" or be
"otherwise related and not isolated." H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 240 (quoting 18 U.S.C.
§ 3575(e) (1988)). "Continuity" requires repetitious activity. H.J. Inc., 492 U.S. at 242.
7 See supra note 67 and accompanying text. See also Tarlow, supra note 60, at 324.
7 See, e.g., Pamela H. Bucy & Steven T. Marshall, An Overview of RICO, 51 ALA.
LAW. 283, 286 (1990) (stating that of reported RICO cases "92 percent ... charged a
violation of 1962(c), or a conspiracy to violate 1962(c)"). See also J. RAKOFF & H.
GOLDSTEIN, RICO: CIVIL AND CRIMINAL LAW AND STRATEGY 1-36 (1991); Tarlow, supra
note 60, at 324.
For the elements of an 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) violation, see supra note 67 and
accompanying text.
" See, e.g., supra note 74. See also 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) (stating that it is
"unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any of the provisions of subsection (a),
(b), or (c) of this section").
The conspiracy must be to violate RICO, not to commit predicate crimes. See RAKOFF
& GOLDSTEIN, supra note 74, at § 1.04[4].
76 See, e.g., United States v. Glecier, 923 F.2d 496, 500 (7th Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 54 (1991) (stating that no overt act is required). But cf. United States v.
Kimble, 719 F.2d 1253, 1256 (5th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 1073 (1984) (stating
that an overt act is required).
Most circuits hold that one need only agree that some member(s) of the conspiracy will
commit predicate crimes, but a few insist that the defendants agree to commit them personally.
See, e.g., Pryba v. United States, 498 U.S. 924, 924-25 (1990) (White, J., dissenting).
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increase the sanctions imposed on "racketeers," RICO conspiracy and
substantive offenses do not merge--one can be convicted of both.77
b. CCE
The Continuing Criminal Enterprise statute, codified as 21 U.S.C.
§ 848 (1988), has been described as "the 'RICO drug statute.' "78 Like
RICO, it was enacted in 1970 as the product of concerns about organized
crime, and targets "enterprise criminality"; unlike RICO, it can be used
against only one kind of organized criminal activity-that involving drugs. 79
CCE makes it an offense to engage in a "continuing criminal
enterprise."" A "continuing criminal enterprise" is defined as the
perpetration of a "continuing series" of federal drug felonies "in
concert with five or more others" as to whom one occupies a
managerial role and from which one "obtains substantial income."'"
77 See, e.g, United States v. Coonan, 938 F.2d 1553, 1566 (2d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1486 (1992). Accord United States v. Rone, 598 F.2d 564, 572 (9th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 445 U.S. 946 (1980).
78 Comment, Constitutionality without Wisdom: Caplin & Drysdale and Monsanto
Examined, 17 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 659, 663 (1990). CCE received far less scholarly
attention than RICO. See id. at 663. But see Richard Finacom, Comment, Successive
Prosecutions and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise: The Double Jeopardy Analysis in
Garrett v. United States, 13 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 785 (1986); Roger McDonough, Note,
Collaring Drug Kingpins: International Extradition and Continuing Criminal Enterprise
in United States v. Levy, 16 MD. J. INT'L L. & TRADE 127 (1992).
"9 See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988); H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1970),
reprinted in, 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4567 (stating that CCE is to serve as a "more
effective means" of controlling drug abuse). See also infra note 80. CCE was enacted
per the Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
513, 84 Stat. 1236 (1970).
80 21 U.S.C. § 848(a) (1988). See McDonough, supra note 78, at 127.
81 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988). A "series" is three or more drug felonies. See United
States v. Young, 745 F.2d 733, 747 (2d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 470 U.S. 1084 (1985);
United States v. Ordonez, 737 F.2d 793, 806 (9th Cir. 1984). CCE's usual penalties are
imprisonment plus a fine and forfeiture of property obtained from the offense, but it can
be a capital crime. See 21 U.S.C. § 848 (a), (e) (1988).
CCE is analogous to another offense which the Organized Crime Control Act of 1970 added
to the federal criminal code. 18 U.S.C. § 1955 (1988), created by Title VIII of the Act, makes
it an offense to conduct, finance, manage, supervise, direct, or own "an illegal gambling
business." 18 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (1988). See also Organized Crime Control Act of 1970, PUB.
L. No. 91-452, § 803(a), 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. (84 Stat.) 937. Such a business operates in
violation of state or local law, involves "five or more persons who conduct, finance, manage,
supervise, direct, or own all or part" of it, and has been "in substantially continuous operation
for" more than thirty days or has produced "a gross revenue of $2,000 in any single day."
18 U.S.C. § 1955(b) (1988). See generally Iannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 791 (1975)
(holding that a conspiracy to violate § 1955 does not merge into substantive violation).
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Here, again, Congress used "enterprise" to focus on "continued criminal
activity.,,82
Like RICO, CCE is a compound offense that one commits by
perpetrating predicate crimes.83 Like RICO, its predicates do not merge
into the compound offense; so one can be convicted of, and punished for,
CCE and the predicate crimes.84 As noted above, one major difference
between RICO and CCE is that CCE is predicated solely on drug crimes,
including a conspiracy defined by 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988).85 Another
difference is that unlike RICO, CCE creates only one offense, which the
Supreme Court has construed as resembling conspiracy more than a
substantive offense.86
82 See, e.g., supra note 56. See generally supra note 64 and accompanying text. The
"series" is analogous to RICO's "pattern" requirement. See William G. Skalitzky,
Aider and Abettor Liability, The Continuing Criminal Enterprise and Street Gangs.: A New
Twist in an Old War on Drugs, 81 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 348, 356 (1990) (stating
that the "series" requirement is meant to identify "propensity for continued criminal
activity").
83 See, e.g., Mortell v. Mortell Co., 887 F.2d 1322, 1325 (7th Cir. 1989) ("RICO is
a compound offense."); United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 498 (7th Cir. 1986),
cert. denied, 479 U.S. 939, 940 (1986) (noting RICO's "compound crime-within-a-crime
nature"); United States v. Martinez-Torres, 556 F. Supp. 1255, 1267 (S.D.N.Y. 1983)
(stating that CCE is a compound offense because it incorporates by reference other
offenses and "compounds those offenses if certain additional elements are present"). See
also supra part II.B.2.a.
84 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 785 (1985) (stating that Congress
intended separate punishments for the underlying substantive predicates and CCE). But
cf. infra note 85.
85 See 21 U.S.C. § 848(c) (1988); 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). The § 846 conspiracy can
be used to obtain a CCE conviction, but punishment cannot be imposed for both because
this was not the intention of Congress. See infra note 86.
86 See Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 794 (1985); Jeffers v. United States, 432
U.S. 137, 149 (1977). Garrett applied merger to CCE, holding that because a § 846
conspiracy is a CCE predicate, cumulative punishment cannot be imposed for both but can
be imposed for CCE and its substantive predicates. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 794-95. This
holding and the holding in Jeffers, suggests that CCE resembles conspiracy more than it
does RICO substantive offenses, as cumulative sentences can be imposed for the latter
even if conspiracies are used as their predicates. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 795
F.2d 278, 280 (3d Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1018 (1987). See generally United
States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250, 1261 (6th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817 (1984)
(stating that CCE "is a conspiracy statute of unique proportions"). Cumulative
punishment can also be imposed for RICO conspiracy and conspiracies used as its
predicate. See, e.g., United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 1992); United




c. Continuing Financial Crimes Enterprise
Late in 1990, Congress adopted 18 U.S.C. § 225, which creates a
white-collar version of CCE entitled conducting a "continuing financial
crimes enterprise" (CFCE).87 Prompted by the savings and loan crisis,
CFCE makes it a crime to organize, manage, or supervise a continuing
financial crimes enterprise from which one receives "$5,000,000 or more
in gross receipts" in "any 24-month period. ' 88 A "continuing financial
crimes enterprise" is defined as "a series of violations" of federal bank
bribery, fraud, and false statement statutes which affect a financial
institution and are committed by four or more persons "acting in
concert." 89
CFCE is an interesting expansion of the approach to compound liability
used in RICO and CCE.90 But since it has been used in only one reported
prosecution, 9' and involves a liability structure that is functionally identical
to CCE, 92 CFCE is not discussed as a distinct entity in the remainder of
this Article. Its strong resemblance to CCE makes this unnecessary, since
propositions that apply to RICO and CCE will also apply to CFCE.
C. Characteristics of Compound Liability
Some commentators contend that neither RICO nor CCE added to the
available categories of prohibited conduct because the acts needed to
commit either offense-the predicate crimes-are already outlawed by other
statutes.93 According to this view, RICO and CCE are analogous to
recidivist statutes in that they enhance the penalties imposed for
committing established crimes.
94
87 See United States v. Harris, 805 F. Supp. 166, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1992); H.R. REP. No.
681(l), 101st Cong., 2d Sess. (1990), reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6472.
88 18 U.S.C. § 225(a) (Supp. III 1991). See also Stanley S. Arkin, Prosecutorial
Vindictiveness and Big-Bang Statutes, N.Y.L.J., June 10, 1993, at 3 (stating that CFCE
had its origins in savings and loan scandal).
89 18 U.S.C. § 225(b) (Supp. III 1991).
90 See, e.g., Arkin, supra note 88, at 32 ("stating that CFCE is another layer of
punishment for prosecutors to pile on to conduct that otherwise constitutes mail, wire or
bank fraud").
9' Harris, 805 F. Supp. at 179.
92 Id. at 180.
93 See, e.g., Blakey & Gettings, supra note 61, at 1021 n.71.
9' See, e.g., United States v. Neapolitan, 791 F.2d 489, 495 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 479
U.S. 939, 940 (1986) (holding that RICO does not create new offenses but merely
imposes "increased sanctions for conduct which is proscribed elsewhere in both federal
and state criminal codes").
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Aside from ignoring legislative history to the contrary,95 this per-
spective fails to perceive the radical innovation these statutes effected-
using extant crimes to create new, "compound" offenses.96 The dis-
tinctive feature of compound offenses is that they let prosecutors further
exploit a practice which emerged from the abrogation of merger: using
essentially the same evidence to impose liability for multiple offenses. 97 A
meaningless redundancy occurs when the criminal law functions merely
"as a device for redressing personal injuries and simple violations of
property interests. ' 98 This feature can become important in a complex
society plagued by the specter of increasingly intricate criminal
behaviors. 99 Such a society will embrace compound liability if it is
" See supra note 49; see also Garrett v. United States, 471 U.S. 773, 782 (1985)
("The intent to create a separate offense could hardly be clearer."); Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, supra note 6, at 939 ("RICO is plainly a
criminal statute; each of its provisions ... defines a certain cluster of behaviors as a new
crime."). See generally H.R. REP. No. 1549, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4007 (describing prohibitions established by RICO).
96 Felony-murder, a common law compound crime, imposes liability for the aggregate
consequences of a course of conduct by holding an offender liable for the felonies she set
out to commit and the resulting deaths. See supra note 50.
Crimes like RICO and CCE also impute liability for the aggregate, foreseeable
consequences of one's acts, but they differ from felony-murder in that they are merely
a device used to establish the causal nexus and mens rea, if any, needed to hold an actor
liable for deaths resulting from the commission of felonies. See Roth & Sundby, supra
note 50, at 453-60. Felony-murder exacts additive liability in the form of convictions for
an unplanned act and for the premeditated felonies from which it arose, but goes no
further. See generally MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.2(l)(b) (Official Draft 1980). If felony-
murder conformed to the RICO-CCE model of compound liability, felony-murder would
impose liability for intended felonies, for deaths ensuing from them, and for a distinct,
compound offense that used the felonies and the deaths as its predicates. See Brenner,
supra note 2, at 934-35.
9' See, e.g., United States v. Eufrasio, 935 F.2d 553, 571 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 340 (1992) ("[S]ame evidence needed to prove the gambling and extortion
predicates charged in the RICO counts would also prove the non-RICO gambling and
extortion allegations."). See generally supra part II.B. 1.
For years, the development of compound offenses was hampered by the use of the
"same evidence" test to determine if the double jeopardy clause barred multiple liability.
See Brenner, supra note 2, at 923-29. See generally supra note 33. The Supreme Court
has not yet disavowed the "same evidence" test as the benchmark of double jeopardy
but has redefined this test so that it now poses little, if any, bar to the use of compound
offenses. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 923-29.
98 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 925-26.
99 See id. at 926:
[S]ingle-offense liability ceases to be satisfactory once society comes to regard the
criminal law as a device for regulating more complex behaviors, because controlling
such behaviors requires that the diverse legal consequences they produce must each be
sanctioned. This can be done by enhancing the penalties imposed for extant offenses
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perceived as offering a means of addressing protracted, complicated
activity against which simple liability is ineffectual. 100 The United States
took this step, on the federal level, in 1970; the adoption of RICO and
CCE that year made compound liability acceptable.
Neither statute would have been possible except for an evolutionary
process that was triggered by the abrogation of merger in conspiracy
prosecutions. 1' As an inchoate offense, conspiracy contemplates the
commission of substantive crimes. 10 2 When it held that conspiracy is a
crime distinct from the substantive offenses it achieves, the Supreme Court
freed prosecutors to use evidence of a conspiracy's success in accomplish-
ing its goals to impose liability both for the conspiracy and for the crimes
it produced.'0 3 The duplicative liability that resulted was the first rent in
the fabric of simple criminal liability and led to the multiplicative liability
imposed by RICO, CCE, and their progeny."
and/or by creating new offense categories. New offense categories can address
behaviors that have not previously been defined as offenses; they can also combine
and/or subdivide behavior that has already been proscribed into a series of new,
discrete offenses.
"0 The Supreme Court acknowledged this characteristic of compound liability in
Garrett v. United States. See Garrett, 471 U.S. at 788-89 (stating that "significant
differences" between simple and compound crimes "caution against ready transposition
of the 'lesser included offense' principles of double jeopardy from the classically simple
situation" addressed by the former "to the multilayered conduct, both as to time and to
place" involved in CCE). Garrett is one of the few decisions in which the Court has
considered the double jeopardy implications of compound offenses. See Brenner, supra
note 2, at 937-40.
o See generally supra part II.B. 1. (describing pre-1970 policies).
102 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 50, at 928 (stating that conspiracy is an agreement
"formed for the purpose of committing a crime"); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 42,
at 681 (stating that conspiracy is "a combination... to accomplish a criminal.., act").
See also United States v. Wallach, 935 F.2d 445, 470 (2d Cir. 1991) ("[S]erves a
preventive function by stopping criminal conduct in its early stages of growth before it
has a full opportunity to bloom.").
103 See, e.g., United States v. Carpenter, 143 F.2d 47, 48 (7th Cir. 1944) (defendant
claiming "duplication of punishment in the imposition of a sentence on the conspiracy
count, for the same evidence was used to gain a conviction on this count as was used to
establish guilt under" three substantive counts). See generally Heike v. United States, 227
U.S. 131, 144 (1913) ("[L]iability for conspiracy is not taken away by its success-that
is, by the accomplishment of the substantive offense at which the conspiracy aims.");
Sneed v. United States, 298 F. 911, 913 (5th Cir. 1924), cert. denied, 265 U.S. 590 (1924)
(stating that "conspiracy remains none the less a crime because by its success an
additional crime was done").
'04 See infra part II.D. It is important to distinguish compound liability, which imposes
additive liability for a single act or course of conduct, from the liability that is imposed
for multiple acts. It has long been settled that an indictment can contain hundreds or even
thousands of counts if each is predicated on a different criminal act. See United States v.
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The most effective way to explain this distinctive liability is to outline
the structure of a RICO case. Assume, therefore, that an indictment has
been returned charging several defendants with one count of violating
§ 1962(c), one count of RICO conspiracy, and fifteen counts of mail and
wire fraud, the latter also serving as predicates for the § 1962(c) charge.'15
The indictment alleges that the defendants used a pattern of racketeering
activity consisting of the predicate acts of mail and wire fraud to conduct
the affairs of an enterprise that is engaged in interstate commerce.'
0 6
To prove the § 1962(c) charge, the prosecutor must establish that the
enterprise existed, that it affected interstate commerce, and that the
defendants engaged in the charged acts of mail and wire fraud and used
the resulting pattern of racketeering activity to conduct the affairs of the
enterprise. 0 7 Aside from proving that the enterprise existed and was
affected by the defendants' racketeering, the evidence that the prosecutor
uses to establish the substantive RICO violation is the same evidence that
she uses for the predicate offenses. 8 To prove the conspiracy, she must
Bernstein, 533 F.2d 775, 784 n.3 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 998 (1976)
(indictment containing "about 800 counts" of conspiracy, bribery and false statement
involving FHA mortgages); United States v. Williams-Davis, 1991 WL 319692 *6 n.1
(D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991) (indictment containing 108 counts charging drug offenses, murder,
attempted murder, and money laundering); Faux v. Jones, 728 F. Supp. 903, 905
(W.D.N.Y. 1990) (indictment containing "340 counts of rape, sodomy, sexual abuse and
endangering the welfare of a child"); United States v. Dempsey, 768 F. Supp. 1256, 1265
(N.D. I11. 1990) (indictment containing "more than 200 counts of mail and wire fraud");
United States v. Beech-Nut Nutrition Corp., 677 F. Supp. 117, 119 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)
(indictment containing 470 counts of selling adulterated and misbranded products); Central
R. Co. of N.J. v. United States, 229 F. 501, 502 (3d Cir. 1915) (indictment containing 200
counts of carrying coal below tariff rate); United States v. Bickford, 24 F. Cas. 1144 (D.
Vt. 1859) (No. 14591) (indictment containing 138 counts charging knowing transmission
of false papers to pension office and subornation of perjury). Indictments such as these
are permissible under the simple model of liability because each charge corresponds to
a distinct criminal act.
'0' See, e.g., United States v. Paccione, 948 F.2d 851, 853 (2d Cir. 1992) (charging the
defendant with 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c),(d) (1988) and multiple mail and wire fraud counts);
United States v. Marcello, 876 F.2d 1147, 1149 (5th Cir. 1989) (same); United States v.
Zauber, 857 F.2d 137, 140 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1066 (1989) (same). See
generally supra part II.B.2.a. (summarizing RICO).
106 See generally supra note 105.
107 See supra part II.B.2.a. To prove a "pattern" of racketeering activity, the
prosecutor must show that the mail and wire fraud offenses were sufficiently "related"
and "continuous" to form a RICO pattern. See supra note 64 (stating that acts must be
"related" and "continuous").
108 See, e.g., United States v. Eufrasio, supra note 97. See also State v. Wallock, 821 P.2d
435, 437 (1991) (rejecting argument that "convictions for promoting prostitution and
unlawful racketeering activity" under Oregon version of RICO should merge "because proof
of the [state RICO crimes] involved the same conduct as proof of the predicate crimes").
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show that the defendants agreed to the commission of the § 1962(c)
offense; if they were personally involved in perpetrating that crime, she
can establish their liability under § 1962(d) by using the evidence she used
to prove, the § 1962(c) violation. 0 9 If the evidence shows that the
defendants engaged in the conduct at issue in the charges, they can be
convicted of:
(1) the fifteen mail and wire fraud offenses constituting the pattern of
racketeering activity involved in the § 1962(c) count;
(2) the § 1962(c) count; and
(3) the § 1962(d) count. 10
'o9 See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1115 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991) (stating that the "same evidence" proved 18 U.S.C.
§ 196 2 (c) (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988) offenses). See also United States v.
Elliott, 571 F.2d 880, 903-04 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 953 (1978) (stating that
the evidence that defendant participated in racketeering activity raises "unmistakable"
inference of agreement to violate 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1970)); United States v. Bright,
630 F.2d 804, 834 (5th Cir. 1980) (same). For the agreement required under 18 U.S.C.
§ 1962(d) (1988), see supra note 76.As to defendants who did not actually perpetrate the § 1962(c) offense, the prosecutor
can convict them of RICO conspiracy by presenting "slight evidence" that they
acquiesced in the commission of the substantive RICO crime; here, too, she can recycle
much of the evidence used to prove the § 1962(c) crime. See, e.g., United States v.
Truglio, 731 F.2d 1123, 1133 (4th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 862 (1985).
"0 This scenario is typical of most RICO cases for it involves two offenses-§ 1962(c)
and § 1962(d). See supra part II.B.2.a. Prosecutors can pursue multiple RICO charges but
rarely do so. See infra note 114. This is attributable to self-imposed rules of restraint and
the fact that prosecutors are still mastering the use of RICO. See generally Dennis, supra
note 5, at 654-55.
It is possible to bring multiple CCE charges against one or more defendants. Since only
one CCE crime exists, such a prosecution would require multiple violations of the statute.
See, e.g., United States v. McHan, 966 F.2d 134, 137 n.l (4th Cir. 1992) (charging the
defendants with two CCE counts); United States v. Wilson, 894 F.2d 1245, 1247 (11 th
Cir. 1990) (same); United States v. Chavez, 845 F.2d 219, 220 (9th Cir. 1988) (same);
United States v. Van Horn, 789 F.2d 1492, 1506 (1lth Cir. 1986) (same). Charges such
as these are permissible if the defendants conducted more than one continuing criminal
enterprise. See generally Ladner v. United States, 358 U.S. 169 (1958) (whether one
discharge from a shotgun that hits two federal officers should be seen as a single assault
or two separate assaults); Bell v. United States, 349 U.S. 81 (1955) (stating that one
transportation of two women for prostitution is one, not two, offenses).
The same conduct can be prosecuted under both RICO and CCE. See, e.g., United
States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 671 (5th Cir. 1992); United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d
1084, 1113 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 2010 (1991); United States v.
Ciancaglini, 858 F.2d 928, 928 (3d Cir. 1988); United States v. Sinito, 723 F.2d 1250,
1262 (7th Cir. 1983). See also infra note 114.
In each of these permutations-multiple RICO charges, multiple CCE charges, and
multiple combined RICO and CCE charges-if the predicates are federal crimes, the court
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The liability configuration employed to achieve this outcome differs
from the approach traditionally used in that the prosecutor can use the
conduct involved in committing the predicate offenses to impose (a) simple
liability for those crimes and (b) compound liability for the RICO
crimes."' The model of simple liability would limit her use of this conduct
to imposing liability for the predicate crimes." 2 The modification of that
model produced by eliminating the merger of conspiracy charges would let
her use it to establish the predicate crimes and conspiracy to commit those
crimes, but would not allow her to use this conduct to "stack"
substantive liability for the predicates and for a compound offense such as
§ 1962(c)." 3 The liability structure outlined above, on the other hand, lets
a prosecutor use evidence of identical conduct to layer liability for
substantive crimes and for conspiracy.
This structure inheres in every RICO prosecution regardless of the
number and nature of RICO and/or predicate crimes charged. 114 It is also
can impose cumulative sentences for all the offenses of conviction. See, e.g., United States
v. Walsh, 700 F.2d 846, 856 (2d Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 826 (1983) (stating
that it is "well settled" that Congress intended cumulative sentences for RICO and its
predicates). If state predicates are used to obtain federal RICO convictions, the federal
court can impose consecutive sentences for the RICO offenses, but the state will have to
prosecute for the predicates. Using state crimes to obtain a federal RICO conviction does
not bar subsequent state prosecution for them, and one who has been acquitted of federal
RICO charges based on state predicates can still be prosecuted for those offenses in a
state court. See United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1105-07 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2010 (1991) (containing unsuccessful challenge to RICO prosecution
following acquittal on predicate offenses in state court). See also United States v. Licavoli,
725 F.2d 1040, 1047 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 467 U.S. 1252 (1984); United States v.
Giovanelli, 945 F.2d 479, 492 (2d Cir. 1991).
.. As this scenario illustrates, compound liability builds upon simple liability, rather
than replacing it-just as a compound sentence is created from simple sentences. See supra
part II.A. As noted earlier, predicates do not merge into a completed substantive offense.
See, e.g., United States v. Deshaw, 974 F.2d 667, 672 (5th Cir. 1992) (stating that
predicates are "not lesser-included offenses of" RICO offense). See also State v.
Johnson, 728 P.2d 473, 481 (N.M. 1986), cert. denied, 481 U.S. 1051 (1987) (stating that
there is no merger under New Mexico RICO statute).
112 See supra part II.A.
"] Also, this model would not let her combine liability for the predicates and resulting
substantive RICO crimes with substantive liability for other compound crimes and liability
for RICO conspiracy plus conspiracy to commit the predicates and/or other compound
crimes. See infra part II.D. 1.
"' The structure outlined above describes most RICO cases since, as noted earlier, the
overwhelming majority involve alleged violations of § 1962(c) and § 1962(d). See supra
part II.B.2.a. Charges under § 1962(a) or § 1962(b) are unusual; and because the pursuit
of compound liability is still in its infancy, almost no criminal RICO cases allege multiple
substantive violations. But see United States v. Sarbello, 985 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1993)
(charging under § 1962(a),(c),(d)); United States v. Romano, 736 F.2d 1432, 1434 n.1
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an integral element of CCE prosecutions, although CCE's one offense
offers a much more limited range of permutations." 5 The next portion of
this discussion explains how this structure is being used,"l6 but first it is
necessary to distinguish it from other forms of compound liability.
Though compound liability is a new phenomenon, RICO and CCE are
not the only extant varieties. Three methods have thus far been used to
compound liability." 7 The oldest splits one crime into several, as when the
Supreme Court's abrogation of merger produced liability for conspiracy
and for the crimes it has achieved." 8 This method produces "serial"
compounding by breaking what was one continuous criminal act into
temporally discrete criminal acts." 9
(11th Cir. 1984) (charging under § 1962(a),(c)). This is more common in civil RICO
cases. See, e.g., Salzmann v. Prudential-Bache Securities, 1993 WL 77374 (S.D.N.Y. Mar.
1, 1993) (alleging violations of § 1962(b)-(d)); Bowman v. W. Auto Supply, 773 F. Supp.
174 (W.D. Mo. 1991), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2459 (1993) (alleging violations of §
1962(a)-(c)); In re Nat'l Mortgage Equity Corp. Mortgage Pool Certificates Sec.
Litigation, 636 F. Supp. 1138, 1170 (C.D. Cal. 1986) (alleged violations of § 1962(a),(d));
Cincinnati Gas & Elec. Co. v. General Electric Co., 656 F. Supp. 49 (S.D. Ohio 1986)
(alleging violations of § 1962(a)-(c)).
" 5 As noted above, CCE consists of one crime-the predicates for which are limited
to federal drug felonies. See supra part II.B.2.b. This eliminates RICO's options of
charging multiple substantive violations and/or combining substantive violations with a
RICO conspiracy count. See supra note 84. Like RICO, however, CCE does allow
liability to be imposed both for the compound crime and its substantive predicates. See
supra note 84.
116 See infra part II.D.
117 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 983. It is highly unlikely that these methods exhaust
the possibilities. See generally infra parts II.D.2. and III.
"' See supra note 103. See also infra note 119. Like attempt and solicitation,
conspiracy is an inchoate offense used to strike at preparatory conduct before it matures
into the completion of a substantive crime. See supra note 102. In holding that merger
applies to the other inchoate offenses, but not to conspiracy, courts have relied on the
proposition that conspiracy also serves another important purpose-that of guarding against
the "special dangers" of group crime. See, e.g., Callanan v. United States, 364 U.S. 587,
593-94 (1961); United States v. Rabinowich, 238 U.S. 78, 88 (1915). See also supra note
49. This proposition may justify imposing liability both for conspiracy and resulting
substantive crimes; but it is beyond dispute that, like attempt and solicitation, the crime
of conspiracy is empirically predicated on conduct which is taken in preparation for
committing one or more substantive crimes. See, e.g., Ford v. United States, 273 U.S. 593,
619 (1927) ("Substantive offense of importing liquor is . . . different one from the
preparatory offense of conspiring to import liquor."); State v. Hardison, 492 A.2d 1009,
1013 (N.J. 1985) ("Conspiracy is similar to attempt, which is a lesser-included offense
of the completed offense.").
" This approach became popular during Prohibition. See, e.g., Albrecht v. United
States, 273 U.S. 1, 11 (1927):
[F]our [counts] charged illegal possession of liquor, four illegal sale . . . . The
contention is that there was double punishment because the liquor which the
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Serial compounding is conceptually analogous to the slightly newer
method of "lateral" compounding. Lateral compounding uses two or
more independent offenses that encompass the same conduct to enhance
the consequences of engaging in that conduct.' 20 Like serial compounding,
it generates iterative liability by letting identical conduct sustain liability
for several offenses; unlike serial compounding, it utilizes unrelated
offenses to this end.' 2' The newest, most complex method, used to create
defendants were convicted for having sold is the same that they were convicted
for having possessed .... There is nothing in the Constitution which prevents
Congress from punishing separately each step leading to the consummation of a
transaction which it has power to prohibit and punishing also the completed
transaction.
For statutes utilizing this approach, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988) (using telephone to
commit or facilitate certain felonies); 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1988) (using interstate commerce
facilities to commit murder-for-hire); 18 U.S.C. § 1952 (1988) (traveling in or using
facilities of interstate or foreign commerce to aid racketeering); 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)
(1988) (possessing firearm in connection with crime of violence or drug trafficking
crime).
20 See, e.g., State v. Wolske, 420 N.W.2d 60 (Wis. 1988), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 1010
(1989) (imposing convictions for homicide by operating a motor boat while intoxicated
and for homicide by negligent operation of a motor boat based on the death of one
person).
121 See supra note 120; see, e.g., Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 303-04
(1932):
Section 1 of the Narcotic Act creates the offense of selling any of the forbidden
drugs except in or from the original stamped package; and section 2 creates the
offense of selling any of such drugs not in pursuance of a written order ....
[T]here was but one sale, and the question is whether, both sections being violated
by the same act, the accused committed two offenses or only one .... [W]e must
conclude that ... two offenses were committed.
See also Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386, 389 (1958) (concerning three drug crimes
based on one sale). The offenses used in serial compounding are related temporally, each
representing a component of what was once a single, continuous offense. See supra note
119 and accompanying text. The offenses used in lateral compounding are an independent
prohibition directed at a unit of conduct; unlike the crimes used in serial
compounding-they bear no necessary relationship to each other. See Gore, 357 U.S. at
391 (one act as committing "three separate offenses created by Congress at three
different times ... seeking to throttle more and more by different legal devices, the traffic
in narcotics"). For statutes using this approach, compare 18 U.S.C. § 2119 (1988)
(stealing vehicle moved in interstate commerce) with 18 U.S.C. § 2313 (1988) (possessing
or selling stolen vehicle moved in interstate commerce). See also 18 U.S.C. § 1959 (1988)
(using violence to establish or maintain position in enterprise engaged in racketeering
activity). See generally United States v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 380 (2d Cir. 1992)
(§ 1959 "complements RICO by allowing the government not only to prosecute under
RICO for conduct that constitutes a pattern of racketeering activity in connection with an
enterprise, but also to prosecute . . . for violent crimes intended . . . to permit the
defendant to maintain or increase his position in a RICO enterprise.").
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RICO and CCE, is "tiered" compounding. It creates iterative liability by
defining a compound offense that results from committing extant crimes
in a way that satisfies specified requirements and by imposing liability for
the compound crime and the predicate crimes. 22 The use of tiering to
compound liability is explained below, but first it is necessary to
distinguish it from the other two approaches.
Tiered compounding is analogous to lateral compounding insofar as it
accomplishes iterative liability by using a new crime which targets conduct
that has already been outlawed. The difference between the two methods
is that tiered compounding makes a causal nexus between the predicate
and compound offenses a prerequisite for iterative liability, while lateral
compounding requires no relationship between the offenses it uses for
compounding.
123
Tiered compounding is analogous to serial compounding in that they
share a concern with timing. Serial compounding divides the conduct
formerly constituting one crime into consecutive offenses; the predicate
crimes used in tiered compounding are the necessary temporal antecedents
of a consummated substantive offense, so that the predicate-compound
sequence could be regarded as a continuing offense. The obvious
difference between these two methods is that instead of splitting an extant
offense into discrete crimes, tiered compounding combines extant offenses
into a new, greater crime.1 24 The subtle difference between tiered
compounding and both of its predecessors lies in their liability structures.
RICO and CCE use a complex structure which augments liability by
tiering or layering; serial and lateral compounding use a flat structure
which augments liability by increasing the number of crimes that
encompass a course of conduct. Unlike structures used for tiered
compounding, the serial-lateral liability structure is flat because it entails
nothing more than identifying an available universe of offenses and
seeking convictions therefor; the offenses share no relationship, each being
prosecuted as an independent infraction, so compounding is an exercise in
cumulating crimes, convictions, and penalties.
Tiered compounding, on the other hand, employs a structure which
requires a relationship among offenses. As the RICO scenario discussed
above illustrates, the relationship is one of cause and effect, and it is used
1 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 983-84.
123 Such a relationship is inconsistent with lateral compounding's operative premise,
which is using a repertoire of functionally independent offenses to address the cumulative
evils inherent in specific conduct. See, e.g., Gore, 357 U.S. at 390 (statutes resulting from
Congress' intent "to turn the screw of the criminal machinery ... tighter and tighter").
124 The description of a compound offense as a "greater" crime is meant to reference
the scope of, and/or penalties imposed for, such a crime and is not intended to suggest
that the predicate crimes merge into it. See supra note 77 and accompanying text.
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to apportion liability between two tiers: the first consists of primary
liability for predicate crimes and for conspiracy to commit them, 125 and the
second consists of derivative liability for RICO/CCE offenses resulting
from the predicate crimes, and derivative liability for conspiracy to commit
substantive RICO offenses. 26 "Primary" and "derivative" are used as
tier designates instead of "simple" and "compound" because, as the
next section illustrates, while second-tier liability is always based on
compound liability, first-tier liability can be based on simple liability or on
compound liability.
D. Applications of Compound Liability
This section is in two parts. The first part analyzes a prosecution
involving RICO and CCE charges to illustrate how tiered compounding is
employed at the federal level; the second examines the use of tiered
compounding among the states.
1 27
1. Federal Law
The number and complexity of prosecutions involving tiered
compounding makes it impossible to itemize all its uses, so this section
illustrates a representative prosecution as an example. Though white-collar
cases can be more intricate, a "mob" case seems an especially fitting de-
vice for this purpose. Assume, therefore, that an indictment has been re-
turned charging thirteen alleged members of the mafia with the following:
28
Count One: 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (RICO);
Count Two: 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO conspiracy);
125 As the next section illustrates, primary liability is not limited to the simple liability
imposed by the "one act, one crime" model, but can itself encompass varieties of
compound liability. See infra part 11.D.1.
126 The Supreme Court has construed CCE as a "super-conspiracy" offense that
subsumes the predicate conspiracy defined by 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988). See supra note 85.
'27 This section focuses on tiered compounding for two reasons, one pragmatic and one
conceptual. Pragmatically, the limitations of this format make it impossible to survey all
uses of compound liability in state and federal law, because, while no systematic empirical
inquiries confirm this, the anecdotal evidence indicates that its use is widespread and
growing. See, e.g., supra note 120. Conceptually, tiered compounding is the most complex
method yet devised to impose iterative liability, and it is reasonable to assume that its
incidence and permutations should provide reliable insights into the factors that are
responsible for this increased use of compound liability.
128 This prosecution is a modified amalgam of facts and charges involved in United
States v. Scarpa, 913 F.2d 993 (2d Cir. 1990) and United States v. Alvarez, 860 F.2d 801













21 U.S.C. § 848 (CCE);
21 U.S.C. §§ 846 and 841 (conspiracy to distribute
marijuana between July, 1989 and February,
1990); 129
21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) (distributing marijuana
between July, 1989 and February, 1990); 130
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (conspiracy to commit extortion
between September, 1989 and January 1, 1990); 131
18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (carrying a firearm in relation
to drug trafficking crime in September, 1989);132
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (conspiracy to commit extortion
between January 15, 1990 and April 2, 1990); 133
18 U.S.C. § 1951 (committing extortion by use and
threats of physical violence on February 20,
1990); 134
18 U.S.C. § 1959 (assault resulting in serious
bodily injury meant to maintain a position in an
enterprise engaged in racketeering on or about
February 20, 1990); 135
21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (using the telephone to
facilitate the conspiracy to distribute and the actual
distribution of marijuana); 136 and
18 U.S.C. § 1952(a) (traveling in interstate
commerce to facilitate marijuana distribution). 137
129 21 U.S.C § 841 (1988) makes it an offense, inter alia, to distribute a controlled
substance such as marijuana; 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) makes it an offense to conspire to
commit a violation of the federal drug laws. See supra note 85 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 129.
131 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988) prohibits using robbery, extortion, or the use or threat of
violence to affect commerce-it also makes it a crime to conspire to this end. Factually,
this count alleges an agreement to use violence and/or the threat of violence to elicit
payment of a debt owed by Sam Beck. The debt arose from drug deals Beck had with the
enterprise alleged in Count One.
132 See supra note 119. Factually, this count alleges that Rogers carried a firearm in the
course of consummating the marijuana offense alleged in Count Five.
133 This count alleges an agreement to use violence and/or the threat of violence to
elicit payment of a debt owed by Larry Rice. He incurred the debt in drug deals with the
enterprise alleged in Count One.
134 See supra note 131. Factually, this count alleges a completed act of extorting money
from Larry Rice. See supra note 133.
135 See supra note 121. Factually, this count alleges an assault committed in the course
of extorting money from Larry Rice.
136 See supra note 119.
137 See supra note 119.
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The defendants are Roe, Doe, Brown, Black, White, Grey, Smith, Jones,
Martin, Will, Rogers, Porter, and Lane.' The enterprise at issue in Counts
One, Two, and Ten is described as an "association in fact" composed of
the defendants plus others and led by Roe. 139 Count One alleges that the
defendants violated § 1962(c) by using a pattern of racketeering activity
consisting of the following predicate acts to conduct the affairs of this
enterprise:
(1) the conspiracy to distribute marijuana, involving Smith, Roe, Doe,
Rogers, and Lane, alleged in Count Four;
(2) the distribution of marijuana, by Smith, Rogers, and Lane, alleged
in Count Five;
(3) a conspiracy involving Smith, Grey, Porter, and Lane to distribute
cocaine hydrochloride between September, 1989 and February,
1990 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
(4) a conspiracy between Smith and Jones to distribute heroin
hydrochloride and cocaine hydrochloride between January, 1991
and March, 1991 in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846;
(5) the murder of Fred Albert committed by Smith, Jones, Grey, and
Black between December 8, 1989 and December 10, 1989 in
violation of New York law;
(6) the extortion conspiracy involving Smith, Grey, and Rogers,
alleged in Count Six;
(7) the extortion conspiracy involving Smith, Jones, Grey, Rogers,
and Black, alleged in Count Eight;
(8) the extortion alleged in Count Nine, perpetrated by Black; and
(9) the bribing by Black of New York City police officers on ten
occasions from November 9, 1989 to February 15, 1990 in
violation of New York law.
Count Two charges all of the defendants with conspiring to commit the
§ 1962(c) offense alleged in Count One. Count Three charges Smith, Roe,
Porter, and Lane with conducting a continuing criminal enterprise
consisting of:
138 Much of this discussion includes references to the liability of the "defendants"
collectively. The references are used for convenience-to avoid having to parse individual
liability for each crime-and are not necessarily meant to indicate that every defendant can
be held liable for every crime at issue in that portion of the discussion. But see Brenner,
supra note 48 (use of imputed liability in RICO actions).
39 See generally supra note 62 and accompanying text. For the propriety of pursuing
such a group as an association in fact, see United States v. Turkette, 452 U.S. 576 (1981).
For the enterprise at issue in Count Three, see supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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(1) the Smith-Roe-Doe-Rogers-Lane marijuana conspiracy alleged in
Count Four;
(2) the Smith-Rogers-Lane distribution of marijuana alleged in Count
Five;
(3) the Smith-Grey-Porter-Lane conspiracy to distribute cocaine
alleged as predicate act (3) in Count One; and
(4) the Smith-Jones conspiracy to distribute heroin and cocaine
alleged as predicate act (4) in Count One. 4 °
Based on the conduct alleged in this indictment, if this case were being
prosecuted in federal court under the classic model of simple liability that
included the merger of conspiracy charges, the defendants could be
charged, at most, with the following five crimes:141
(1) distributing marijuana;
(2) committing extortion;
(3) conspiring to commit extortion (1989-1990);
(4) conspiring to distribute cocaine; and
(5) conspiring to distribute cocaine and heroin. 42
The marijuana distribution alleged in Count Five and the extortion
alleged in Count Nine survive because each is a distinct substantive
offense. 143 The conspiracy to extort alleged in Count Six does not merge
into the extortion alleged in Count Nine because it sought the commission
of a different act of extortion.' 44 The cocaine conspiracy alleged as
140 See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
141 The discussion that follows assumes, for the most part, that the conduct alleged in
the indictment is encompassed by federal law and can be prosecuted in federal court. Cf.
infra note 142. This assumption is necessary because many of the charges in the
indictment are based on varieties of compound liability, which makes it difficult to
translate the conduct at issue in those charges into simple liability. See, e.g., supra notes
135-37 and accompanying text.
142 This list results from construing the facts in favor of the prosecution's ability to
bring as many charges as possible. If the facts were analyzed under a stringent version
of the simple model, the surviving drug conspiracies might merge into each other or into
the substantive marijuana offense-the latter could be justified on the grounds that there
was one continuing conspiracy, the object of which was to distribute drugs. See supra note
37 and accompanying text.
The defendants can be prosecuted for Albert's murder and the acts of bribery alleged
in Count One; but since a federal court would not have jurisdiction over these crimes per
se, they are not included in the list above. See generally supra note 110.
"4 The simple model would allow the charging of multiple counts of distributing
marijuana if each were based on a distinct criminal act. See supra note 104.
'" See supra note 133.
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predicate act (3) and the heroin/cocaine conspiracy alleged as predicate act
(4) in Count One would merge into consummated drug crimes had either
conspiracy accomplished substantive crimes, but this did not occur; these
conspiracies do not merge because they existed at different times and for
different reasons. 14
5
On the other hand, the conspiracy to distribute marijuana alleged in
Count Four does merge into the distribution alleged in Count Five, and the
conspiracy to extort alleged in Count Eight merges into the extortion
alleged in Count Nine. 46 The charge of carrying a firearm in connection
with drug trafficking alleged in Count Seven merges into the marijuana
distribution because Rogers carried a weapon while perpetrating that
crime. 47 The assault alleged in Count Ten merges into the extortion
alleged in Count Nine because it was used to perpetrate that offense.
48
Additionally, the use of the telephone and travel alleged in Counts Eleven
and Twelve, respectively, merge into the marijuana distribution because
both types of conduct were used to commit that crime. 149
Though it is difficult to translate RICO and CCE offenses into simple
liability, it seems that the substantive RICO offense alleged in Count One
would merge into the five crimes listed above because each constituted one
of its predicates. Simple liability would presumably enforce its "one act-
one crime" principle by construing a substantive RICO offense as nothing
more than the sum of its parts-i.e., its predicate crimes-and imposing
liability for as many of the latter as survive the effects of merger. The
RICO conspiracy alleged in Count Two should merge into the same
surviving predicates because it sought commission of the § 1962(c) offense
of which they were substantive constituents; using the reductionist
approach applied to Count One, the simple model would construe it as a
conspiracy to commit the predicate offenses. This approach would clearly
encompass the offense alleged in Count Three because CCE is regarded as
a "super-conspiracy." 15 Because the simple model merges conspiracy
into completed substantive crimes, it would merge this CCE count into the
only completed drug offense, the marijuana distribution.
Under the simple model, therefore, these defendants can be prosecuted
for two substantive offenses, distributing marijuana and extortion, and
three conspiracies, to extort, to distribute cocaine, and to distribute heroin
and cocaine. A prosecutor using compound liability, however, can create
145 See, e.g., United States v. Albernaz, 450 U.S. 333, 343 (1981). But see supra note
142.
146 See, e.g., supra note 133.
147 See supra note 132.
148 See supra note 135.
149 See supra note 119.
150 See supra note 126.
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a pattern of interlocking charges that generate the following two-tiered
liability structure: 15 1
Primary Liability
Conspiracy to distribute marijuana*
Distributing marijuana
Conspiracy to commit extortion (1989-1990)*
Carrying a firearm in drug trafficking*
Conspiracy to commit extortion (1990)*
Extortion
Assault to maintain position in racketeering enterprise**
Using telephone to facilitate marijuana distribution*




* 18 U.S.C. § 1962(c) (RICO)
18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (RICO)*
* 21 U.S.C. § 848 (CCE)
As noted earlier, the second-tier offenses-the derivative liability
crimes-are products of tiered compounding. 152 The only way one can
commit these offenses is to commit first-tier offenses-the primary liability
crimes-because second-tier offenses result from committing first-tier
offenses. 5 3 Second-tier offenses are inconceivable under the simple model
because the conduct used to commit these crimes has already been
151 The structure includes the conspiracies to distribute cocaine and heroin/cocaine
because these are federal crimes that could have been pursued independently, as well as
being used as RICO predicates. Neither Albert's murder, nor the acts of bribing New
York City police officers, are included because these are state offenses which could not
be pursued in a federal court. See supra note 142. Of course, it might be possible to bring
either or both crimes within the compass of federal statutes, in which case they too could
be prosecuted in the action outlined above. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1958 (1988) (using
interstate commerce facilities to commit murder-for-hire).
152 See supra part II.C.
153 See supra part II.C. Of course, second-tier crimes like RICO and CCE also require
the presence of additional elements, such as the use of a pattern of racketeering activity
resulting from the commission of first-tier crimes, to have a prohibited impact on the
affairs of an enterprise engaged in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce. See supra
part II.C.
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outlawed by other federal criminal statutes; the resulting duplication of
liability violates the simple model's "one act-one crime" principle.'54
Unlike second-tier offenses, which result exclusively from tiered
compounding, first-tier offenses-primary liability crimes-are the products
of simple liability or of varieties of compound liability other than tiered
compounding. In other words, first-tier crimes derive from simple liability,
serial compounding, or lateral compounding.155 The liability structure given
above illustrates this by indicating which option is responsible for each
first-tier offense: crimes with no asterisk originate in simple liability; 156
crimes with one asterisk are the products of serial compounding;' 57 and
those crimes with two asterisks result from lateral compounding. 58
154 See supra part II.A.
155 See supra part II.C.
156 Distributing marijuana and extortion are the products of simple liability because
each offense consists of a single course of conduct that achieves, or is designed to
achieve, a given result. See, e.g., supra note 13 and accompanying text. Depending upon
the facts, it might be possible to dissect the distribution of marijuana charge into multiple
offenses, each representing a different instance of engaging in the conduct prohibited by
that statute. See supra note 104. This would admittedly multiply the liability imposed on
the defendants, but it would not violate the "one act-one crime" principle, since each
offense would represent a distinct violation of the statute. See generally supra note 104.
"' Serial compounding breaks a course of conduct into sequential offenses, each
offense representing a step toward the consummation of some criminal goal. See supra
note 119 and accompanying text. The above identified products of serial compounding fall
into two categories: conspiracies and drug crimes. Conspiracy offenses transform what
was once regarded as preparatory conduct into an offense distinct from any crime that
ensues. See generally supra note 118. All five conspiracies listed above are, therefore, the
result of serial compounding; each contemplates the commission of a specific substantive
crime. With the abrogation of merger, it is irrelevant that two conspiracies culminated in
substantive crimes while the others did not.
The other crimes-carrying a firearm in drug trafficking plus using the telephone and
traveling to facilitate marijuana distribution-were created by dissecting conduct that was
once generically attributable to drug trafficking into component offenses. It is as if, during
Al Capone's reign in Chicago, Congress had made it a federal crime to, respectively,
carry a weapon while dealing in illegal liquor, use the telephone to deal in illegal liquor,
and travel to deal in illegal liquor.
158 Lateral compounding uses independent offenses encompassing the same conduct to
enhance liability. See supra note 120. Only one of the crimes listed above-assault to
maintain a position in a racketeering enterprise-is the product of this method. While it can
be difficult to determine if offenses result from serial or lateral compounding, especially
when complex crimes like RICO and CCE are implicated, this crime obviously results
from lateral compounding. It produces iterative liability for the conduct at issue because
assault is almost certainly an offense under applicable state law; and assault is
encompassed by the extortion offense established by 18 U.S.C. § 1951 (1988). See also
MODEL PENAL CODE § 211.1 (1985); see, e.g., supra note 135. Also, the legislative
history of 18 U.S.C. § 1959 reveals that Congress intended to enact this part of the Code
as a means of enhancing liability imposed under RICO. See S. REP. No. 225, 98th Cong.,
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The effects of this derivation of first-tier offenses become apparent
when one considers the role that compound liability plays in the liability
structure given above. 59 Parsing the crimes according to the nature of the
liability responsible for each produces the following configuration:
Simple Liability Compound Liabiliy
Distributing marijuana Marijuana conspiracy
Extortion Extortion conspiracy (1989-1990)
Extortion conspiracy (1990)
Carrying firearm in drug trafficking
Assault to maintain position in racketeering
enterprise
Using telephone in marijuana distribution
Traveling to facilitate marijuana distribution
Cocaine conspiracy
Heroin/cocaine conspiracy
Aside from the assault, which itself reiterates an offense cognizable at
state law, 6 ° the conduct used to commit extortion and distribute marijuana
gives rise to a multiplicity of charges, each of which can result in
conviction and additive punishment.' 6' When the second-tier RICO and
CCE charges are factored in, conduct that empirically constitutes the
commission of two crimes supports charges for committing fourteen
crimes.162 This figure represents a modest venture into compound liability;
1st Sess. 307 (1983), reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3486. See also United States
v. Concepcion, 983 F.2d 369, 381 (2d Cir. 1992).
159 See supra chart in text accompanying note 151.
"6 See supra note 158.
161 See, e.g., supra note 86.
162 This includes the cocaine and heroin/cocaine conspiracies that were alleged as
predicates for the RICO offense charged in Count One. The original indictment did not
charge these as distinct crimes, but could have done so subject to the condition that either
or both crimes might merge into the CCE charge contained in Count Three. See supra
note 86.
The figure given above does not include liability that can be imposed under state law
in accordance with the dual sovereignty doctrine. See supra note 34 and accompanying
text. Based on the facts, the defendants could be charged with, inter alia, assault, violating
state drug laws, conspiracy to violate state drug laws, extortion at state law, conspiracy
to commit extortion at state law, and violating state RICO laws. See, e.g., Commonwealth
v. Besch, 614 A.2d 1155 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (prosecuting under both state drug and
RICO statutes); MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 5.03, 211.2, 223.4 (1985) (creating model state
assault, conspiracy, and extortion offenses). In addition, they could be prosecuted for
Albert's murder and for the acts of bribery-neither of which were pursued under federal
law. See supra note 142.
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it could easily be increased without introducing evidence of additional
conduct.
The prosecutor could, for example, add two substantive RICO counts
by charging the defendants with using the same pattern of racketeering
activity to acquire or maintain an interest in, or control of, the enterprise;
and with using income derived from this pattern of racketeering activity
to acquire an interest in the enterprise or to establish or operate it.'63 The
distribution of marijuana charge, which is based on simple liability, may
not be divisible into multiple crimes. If, however, the defendants made
several phone calls and/or several interstate trips or trips abroad to
facilitate that distribution, each call and each trip can become a new
count.' 64 If the defendants made ten such phone calls and three such trips,
this activity, which was a necessary component of the marijuana
distribution offense, sustains thirteen additional charges; these, in addition
to the two new RICO counts, would bring the total federal charges to
nineteen.
This charge inflation may seem remarkable, but it pales in comparison
to the cases which have recently been brought to court. In United States
v. Williams-Davis, 65 for example, twenty-four defendants were charged in
113 counts with 2 RICO offenses (§§ 1962(c) and 1962(d)), 1 CCE
offense (21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy), and 108 substantive crimes that
included murder, attempted murder, assault, weapons offenses, possessing
drugs with intent to distribute, distributing drugs, laundering drug proceeds,
and using telephones to facilitate drug crimes. 166 All of the charges were
based on the allegation that the defendants had operated "an extensive
narcotics conspiracy known as the R Street Organization."'' 67 Seventy-six
of the 108 substantive crimes were used as predicates for the § 1962(c)
count; the CCE count was predicated on the 21 U.S.C. § 846 conspiracy
plus substantive drug offenses. 68 As occurred with the charges hypothe-
sized in the preceding paragraph, here, too, conduct that was used to
commit substantive drug crimes was allocated among numerous first-tier
163 See 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(b) (1988). See also supra part II.B.2.a.
'64 See United States v. Polizzi, 500 F.2d 856, 899 (9th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 1120 (1975) (stating that "[e]ach act of travel" is a separate violation of § 1952);
21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988) (stating that each use of telephone is "a separate offense").
See generally supra note 119.
165 1991 WL 319692 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991).
166 Id. at * 1, *6 n. 1. Federal jurisdiction existed over the murders, attempted murders,
and assaults because the case arose in the District of Columbia. See United States v.
Williams-Davis, 1992 WL 38448, at *1 (D.D.C. Feb. 5 1992).
67 United States v. Williams-Davis, 1991 WL 319692, at *1 (D.D.C. Dec. 16, 1991).




and second-tier offenses so as to impose an iterative liability far exceeding
that which the simple model would impose for those drug crimes.
Neither the charges in Williams-Davis nor those hypothesized above are
unusual. 169 The incidence of charge configurations such as these is too
great even to summarize. 170 Given the popularity of these configurations,
it is surprising that federal law remains content with first-tier and second-
tier offenses, and has not experimented with multi-tiered compounding or




At least thirty-three states have adopted statutes comparable to RICO
and/or CCE.172 Like their prototypes, many state statutes resulted from a
169 See, e.g., United States v. Casamento, 887 F.2d 1141, 1147 (2d Cir. 1989), cert.
denied, 493 U.S. 1081 (1990) (prosecuting for 16 counts charging 35 defendants with
RICO conspiracy, CCE, conspiracies under 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) and 18 U.S.C. § 371
(1988), false statements to Internal Revenue Service, and currency transportation
offenses); United States v. Kopituk, 690 F.2d 1289 (1 1th Cir. 1982), cert denied, 463 U.S.
1209 (1983) (prosecuting for 70 counts charging 22 defendants with violating § 1962(c),
(d), extortion, labor crimes, obstructing justice, and filing false income tax returns).
170 See Marcus, supra note 6.
17' Even CFCE, the newest compound offense, uses two-tiered compounding. See supra
part II.B.2.c. But see Brenner, supra note 2, at 972-78 (proposing a third-tier offense).
172 Most of the statutes are RICO variations. See ALASKA STAT. § 11.71.010(a)(3)
(1992); ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301 to -2317 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-414
(Michie 1991); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186-6.8 (West 1993); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 18-17-101 to -109 (West 1993); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 53-393 to 55-403 (West
1982); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 11, §§ 1501-11 (1993); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.20,
§§ 895.01-.09 (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-14-1 to -15 (Michie 1992); HAW. REV.
STAT. §§ 842-1 to -12 (1993); IDAHO CODE §§ 18-7801 to -7805 (1993); ILL. ANN. STAT.
ch. 56-1/2, paras. 1651-1659 (Smith-Hurd 1993); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-6-1 to -2
(Bums 1993); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-4401 (1993); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1351,
§ 15:1356 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 609.902 to .912 (West 1993); MISS. CODE
ANN. §§ 97-43-1 to -11 (1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-125 (1993); NEV. REV. STAT.
ANN. §§ 207.350 to .520 (Michie 1993); N.J. REV. STAT. §§ 2C:41-1 to -6.2 (1993); N.M.
STAT. ANN. §§ 30-42-1 to -6 (Michie 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 460.00 to .80
(McKinney 1989); N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 75D-3 to -4, § 90-95.1 (1993); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§§ 75D-1 to -14, § 90-95.1 (1993); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 12.01-06.1 to -06.8 (1993); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2923.31 to .36 (1993); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 1401 to 1419
(West 1993); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 166.715 to .735 (1993); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911
(1993); R.I. GEN. LAWS §§ 7-15-1 to -11 (1993); TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 39-12-201 to -210
(1993); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 76-10-1601 to -1609 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 9A.82.001 to .904 (West 1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 946.80 to .87 (West 1993).
A number of states, however, have versions of CCE. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT.
§ 11.71.010(a)(3) (1992); ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-414 (Michie 1991); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 893.20 (West 1993); MONT. CODE ANN. § 45-9-125 (1993); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3
(West 1992); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-95.1 (1993); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.85 (West 1993).
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legislative discovery of organized crime. 173 Since most are based, often
quite literally, 74 on their federal counterparts, courts in these states use
RICO/CCE jurisprudence in construing the state provisions.175
State statutes that track RICO and CCE are useful indicators of the
growing popularity of compound liability, and especially of tiered
compounding; but aside from that, they are not of particular significance
to this discussion. 176 This article is an effort to ascertain why compound
liability is popular. Data concerning the adoption and use of RICO/CCE
clones does not appreciably advance this endeavor because states with
See also infra note 203, for Kentucky's version of CCE. See generally P.R. LAWS ANN.
tit. 24, § 2408 (1992); V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 19, § 611 (1991).
171 See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 15025 to 15026 (West 1992); COLO. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 18-10-101 (West 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 460.00 (McKinney 1989); 18 PA.
CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911(a) (1993).
174 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV, STAT. ANN. § 13-2312 (1992) (RICO); COLO. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 18-17-104 (1993) (RICO); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-395 (West 1982) (RICO); FLA.
STAT. ANN. § 895.03 (West 1993) (RICO); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-14-4 (Michie 1993)
(RICO); IDAHO CODE § 18-7804 (1987) (RICO); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-6-2 (Bums
1993) (RICO); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1353 (West 1993) (RICO); MISS. CODE ANN.
§ 97-43-5 (1993) (RICO); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-2 (1993) (RICO); OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2923.32 (1992); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, § 1403 (West 1993) (RICO); OR. REV.
STAT. § 166.720 (1993) (RICO); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 911 (1993) (RICO); WIS.
STAT. ANN. § 946.83 (West 1993) (RICO); ALASKA STAT. ANN. § 11.71.010(b) (CCE);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-64-414 (CCE); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 893.20 (1992) (CCE); MONT.
CODE ANN. § 45-9-125 (1993) (CCE); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (1993) (CCE); N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 90-95.1 (1993) (CCE); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 946.85 (West 1993) (CCE). See
generally UNIFORM CONTROLLED SUBSTANCES ACT § 411 (1990) (model CCE statute).
175 See, e.g., State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 868, 873 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988), aff'd, 750 P.2d
874 (Ariz. 1988) (using federal case law in construing state CCE statute); Carroll v. State,
459 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984), review denied, 464 So. 2d 554 (Fla. 1985)
(using federal cases in construing state RICO statute); State v. Wynne, 767 P.2d 373
(N.M. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 767 P.2d 354 (N.M. 1989) (same); State v. Hughes,
767 P.2d 382 (N.M. Ct. App. 1988), review denied, 767 P.2d 354 (N.M. 1989) (same);
State v. Blossom, 744 P.2d 281 (Or. Ct. App. 1987), review denied, 749 P.2d 136 (Or.
1988) (same); State v. Evers, 472 N.W.2d 828, 831-32 (Wis. Ct. App. 1991), review
denied, 475 N.W.2d 164 (Wis. 1991) (same); State v. Judd, 433 N.W.2d 260, 262-63
(Wis. Ct. App, 1988), review denied, 439 N.W.2d 142 (Wis. 1989) (same).
176 This Article is concerned with analyzing compound liability as a generic
phenomenon consisting of serial, lateral, tiered, and any other identifiable varieties of
compounding. The spatial constraints of this format, however, make it impossible to
analyze all uses of compound liability in the fifty states. The discussion above, therefore,
concentrates on tiered compounding, assuming that its use is a reliable indicator of the
utilization of other kinds of compound liability.
For state prosecutions involving the type of charge configurations discussed in the
preceding section, see, e.g., State v. Hughes, 1992 WL 52473 (Ohio Ct. App. Mar. 13,
1992); State v. Wallock, 821 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Besch, 614
A.2d 1155, 1146 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992). See supra part II.D.1.
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statutes such as these are merely recapitulating the federal experience with
tiered compounding.'77 One can, therefore, confidently attribute compound
liability's popularity in these jurisdictions either to the same forces that are
producing this effect on the federal level or to some level of calculated
mimicry. In either instance, investigating the use of compound liability in
these states would not appreciably promote this undertaking.
What seems more promising is an examination of morphogenic
sports-products of tiered compounding that are quite unlike RICO or CCE.
These somewhat idiosyncratic statutes can be grouped into three
categories: gang statutes, 178 criminal syndicate statutes, 179 and leading
organized crime statutes. 80 A few states combine statutes from these
categories with each other and/or with their RICO/CCE statutes to create
even more distinct versions of compound liability.' 8' The sections below
examine the basic categories before exploring these permutations.
a. Gang Statutes
A surprising number of states have adopted gang statutes,'82 that
typically make it a crime to commit, to abet another's commission of,
and/or to conspire to commit crimes that are intended to further the
activities of a "criminal street gang."' 83 Like RICO and CCE, these
177 See generally Carroll v. State, 459 So. 2d 368 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
(prosecuting under RICO clone); State v. Wallock, 821 P.2d 435 (Or. Ct. App. 1991),
review denied, 828 P.2d 458 (Or. 1990) (same); State v. Evers, 472 N.W.2d 828 (Wis.
Ct. App. 1991) (same). See also supra note 174.
Some state RICO/CCE statutes explicitly indicate that both first and second-tier liability
are to be imposed. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 53-396(c) (West 1985) ("The
court Shall impose a separate sentence on any separately charged offense of which the
defendant has been found guilty notwithstanding that the offense also constitutes an
incident of racketeering activity.").
178 See infra part II.D.2.a.
17 See infra part II.D.2.b.
180 See infra part II.D.2.c.
181 See infra part II.D.2.d.
182 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301 (1992); CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22
(West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 16-15-3 to 16-15-5 (Michie 1992); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
740, para. 147/10 (Smith-Hurd 1992); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 35-45-9-1 to 35-45-9-5 (Bums
1992); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 723A.1 to 723A.2 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.
§§ 15:1403 to 15:1404 (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229 (West 1992); NEV.
REV. STAT. § 193.168 (1991); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (West 1992); TEX. PENAL
CODE ANN. §§ 71.01 to 71.03 (West 1993).
183 See, e.g., TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a) (West 1993) ("A person commits an
offense if, with the intent to establish, maintain, or participate in ... a criminal street
gang, he commits or conspires to commit one or more" crimes that include murder,
arson, robbery, burglary, kidnapping, assault, sexual assault, forgery, gambling offenses,
19931
276 WILLIAM AND MARY BILL OF RIGHTS JOURNAL [Vol. 2:2
statutes are prompted by the perceived dangers of organized crime; but
they target a new incarnation, "street gang" entities, which in one
legislature's words, "commit a multitude of crimes against . . . peaceful
citizens. '  Iowa's statute gives a representative definition of this
concept:
'Criminal street gang' means any ongoing organization,
association, or group of three or more persons, whether
formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities
the commission of one or more criminal acts, which has an
identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, and whose
members individually or collectively engage in or have
engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity.185
prostitution offenses, illegal weapons offenses, drug crimes, obscenity offenses, and
various other felonies.). Accord ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(F) (1992); CAL. PENAL
CODE § 186.22(a) (West 1993); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-4(a) (Michie 1992); IND. CODE
ANN. § 35-45-9-3 (Bums 1992); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.2 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 15:1403(a) (West 1993); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229(2) (West 1992). See
generally NEV. REV. STAT. § 193.168 (1991) (imposing additional penalty for crimes
committed to benefit criminal gang but does not create separate offense). Cf. ILL. ANN.
STAT. ch. 38, para. 1755(d) (Smith-Hurd 1993) ("[I]ntent of the General Assembly in
enacting this Act to create a civil remedy against streetgangs and their members.").
"84 CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.21 (West 1993) (citing "a state of crisis"). Accord GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-15-2(b) (1992) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 1402(B) (West 1992)
(same). See also ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 740, para. 147/5 (Smith-Hurd 1993) (citing a "clear
and present danger to public order and safety"). For evidence that gang activity is not
a recent phenomenon, see, e.g., Olmstead v. United States, 19 F.2d 842 (9th Cir. 1927),
aff'd, 277 U.S. 438 (1928) (indicting 91 members of "Olmstead gang" for Prohibition
violations); People v. Ford, 191 N.E. 315, 316 (I11. 1934) (referring to "Touhy gang");
State v. Silsby, 152 So. 323, 326 (La. 1933), cert. denied, 292 U.S. 599 (1934) (referring
to member of "Egan Rats Gang of St. Louis"); People v. Salimone, 251 N.W. 594, 596-
97 (Mich. 1933) (referring to gang which conspired to violate Prohibition Act); People v.
Giordano, 259 N.Y.S. 178, 182 (1932) (referring to murder of "'rival gang" members);
Makley v. State, 197 N.E. 339, 342 (Ohio Ct. App. 1934) (stating that gang members
"experts in the use of machine guns and other firearms" and "equipped with
high-powered automobiles").
185 IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.1(2) (West 1992). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2301(2) (1992) (defining criminal syndicate as "composed of three or more
persons" that commits or intends to commit felonies); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-3(1)
(Michie 1992) ("[A]ny ongoing organization, association, or group of three or more
persons, whether formal or informal, having as one of its primary activities the
commission of one or more [enumerated] criminal acts . . .and which has a common
name or common identifying sign or symbol and the members of which, individually or
collectively, engage in or have engaged in a pattern of criminal gang activity."); IND.
CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-1 (Bums 1993) (defining as group of at least five persons that
promotes, assists or participates in, and "requires as a condition of membership"
commission of one or more felonies); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1404(A) (West 1993)
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Most of the statutes are products of lateral compounding, 8 6 though some
originate in serial compounding. 8 7 An Iowa case illustrates how the two
methods can work in tandem.'88
Anthony Browne, Buddy Black, and other members of the Black
Gangster Disciples had an altercation with rival gang member Dewey
Lamp, whom they followed home.' 89 There, Black, who was carrying a
handgun, "approached a window. When a figure came into view, some
member of the gang yelled 'cap the bitch.' Black then fired .... The
bullet struck Dewey Lamp's mother, puncturing her lung."' 90 Charged
with aiding and abetting attempted murder, willful injury, and criminal
gang participation, Browne was acquitted on the murder charge but was
convicted of the other offenses.' 9'
The Iowa Supreme Court upheld Browne's conviction for willful injury
because it found that he aided and abetted the shooting of Lamp's mother,
if only by accompanying Black to her home. 192 The third charge required
the prosecutor to prove that Browne had aided and abetted a criminal act
"committed for the benefit of, at the direction of, or in association with"
(same); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229(1) (West 1992) (same); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 193.168(6) (1991) (same); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 856 (West 1992) (same); TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 7 1.01(d) (West 1993) ("[T]hree or more persons having a common
identifying sign or symbol or an identifiable leadership who continuously or regularly
associate in the commission of criminal activities.").
186 See supra note 120 and accompanying text. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a)
(West 1993) (abetting felony committed by gang); GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-4(a) (1992)
(same); IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.2 (West 1992) (abetting crime committed for benefit
of gang); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1403(A) (West 1993) (furthering or assisting
"pattern of criminal gang activity"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229(2) (West 1992)
(committing crime to promote, further, or assist "criminal conduct by gang members");
TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a) (West 1993) (committing or conspiring to commit
offenses listed in the statute quoted in supra note 183). See generally IND. CODE ANN.
§ 35-45-9-3 (Bums 1992) ("participating" in criminal gang). For other statutes targeting
such conduct, see, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 12022.4 (West 1992); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-4-8, 16-13-33 (Michie 1992); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-41-5-2 (Bums 1992); IOWA
CODE ANN. §§ 703.1, 706.1 (West 1992); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 14:26 (West 1993);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.175 (West 1992); TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. §815.02 (West 1993).
'"? See supra note 119 and accompanying text. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2308(F) (1992) (organizing, directing, or financing criminal syndicate to benefit
criminal street gang or assist crimes perpetrated by it). See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2301(C)(2) (1992) (defining criminal syndicate).
,88 See State v. Browne, 494 N.W.2d 241 (Iowa 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 3051
(1993).
189 Id. at 242.
190 Id.
'9' Id. at 242-43.
192 id.
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a criminal street gang as defined above.'93 To bring the Black Gangster
Disciples within that definition, the prosecution had to show that the gang
had engaged in a "pattern of criminal gang activity," statutorily defined
as, "[t]he commission, attempt to commit, conspiring to commit, or
solicitation of two or more criminal acts, provided the criminal acts were
committed on separate dates or by two or more persons who are members
of, or belong to, the same criminal street gang."
'194
The Iowa Supreme Court affirmed Browne's conviction on this count
because it found that the evidence established a pattern of criminal gang
activity consisting of two criminal acts-"going armed with intent and
terrorism."' 95 Specifically, the acts were Black's taking his gun to Lamp's
home and shooting it at Mrs. Lamp.' 96 By accompanying Black and other
gang members, Browne simultaneously committed willful injury by aiding
and abetting Black's shooting Mrs. Lamp and criminal gang participation
by aiding and abetting Black's taking a weapon to Lamp's home and
firing it with the intent to provoke fear or anger. 197
Under the model of simple liability, Browne could, at most, have been
convicted of aiding and abetting Black's shooting of Mrs. Lamp. 98 That
model would construe all of his actions as one course of conduct designed
to achieve this end, as opposed to dissecting them into acts taken to abet
the weapons transportation, the firing of the weapon, and the injury to Mrs.
Lamp.' 99 The net effect of these Iowa statutes is an iterative liability that
is the joint product of lateral compounding, using the willful injury and
criminal gang participation statutes against the same conduct, and serial
compounding, splitting the conduct that led to the injury into three
9 Id. (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 723A. 1 to 723A.2 (West 1992)) (stating that it is
an offense to "aid and abet any criminal act committed" by or for street gang). See also
IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.1(1) (West 1992) (defining "criminal act"). See supra note
185 and accompanying text.
194 Browne, 494 N.W.2d at 242 (quoting IOWA CODE ANN. § 723A.1(3) (West 1992)).
195 Id. at 243-44. See also id. at 244 (stating that it is "not necessary" that "offenses
be committed on separate dates if two or more gang members were involved in"
committing them). See generally IOWA CODE ANN. § 708.8 (West 1992) (stating that it
is an offense to go "armed with any dangerous weapon with the intent to use" it against
another); IOWA CPDE ANN. § 708.6 (West 1992) (stating that terrorism includes
discharging dangerous weapon into occupied building with "intent to injure or provoke
fear or anger"). Both offenses are Class D felonies. See id.
196 See Browne, 494 N.W.2d at 244.
"' Id. See also supra note 195.
'9' See supra parts II.A. and II.C. For general principles of aider and abettor liability,
see MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985).
199 See, e.g., Browne, 494 N.W.2d at 244 ("[T]he offense of going armed with intent
clearly preceded the willful injury offense. The State's theory of 'terrorism' was
predicated on Black's act of shooting into a building. That act preceded the injury
sustained by the victim upon the impact of the bullet.").
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temporal parts, and using the two types of compounding to sustain liability
for criminal gang participation and the other to sustain liability for aiding
and abetting willful injury.20°
Although the gang participation statute is structurally dissimilar to
RICO or CCE, it is, as Browne illustrates, at least partially attributable to
tiered compounding. The statute parsed Browne's conduct into two first-
tier, predicate crimes, courtesy of serial compounding, and used those
crimes to impose second-tier, derivative liability for gang participation.2 °'
At least six other states have statutes that would achieve a similar result.
20 2
b. Criminal Syndicate Statutes
Two states, Arizona and Nevada, have statutes outlawing "criminal
syndicates, ' 20 3 while North Dakota has a functionally identical provision
200 See supra part II.C.
201 See supra parts II.C. and II.D. 1. The major difference between the Iowa statute as
applied in Browne and RICO/CCE is that the former did not impose liability for both the
first and second-tier offenses. See supra note 200 and accompanying text. The opinion
does not indicate whether this was an option that the prosecutor chose not to pursue or
whether first-tier predicates merged into second-tier offenses under this statute. See
generally IOWA CODE ANN. § 701.9 (West 1992) (referring to merger of lesser included
offenses). But see LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1403(A) (West 1992) ("Any sentence of
imprisonment imposed pursuant to this Section shall be in addition and consecutive to
any sentence imposed for an underlying offense committed in the pattern of criminal
gang activity."). The substantive provisions of the Louisiana statute are quoted infra
note 202.
202 See CAL. PENAL CODE § 186.22(a) (West 1992) (stating that it is illegal to
participate in gang and promote "any felonious criminal conduct" by gang members);
GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-4(a) (1992) (same); IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-3 (Burns 1993)
(stating that it is illegal to "knowingly or intentionally actively" participate in gang); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 15:1403(A) (West 1992) (stating that it is illegal to participate, direct,
or assist "pattern of criminal gang activity"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229(2) (West
1992) (stating that it is illegal to commit "a crime for the benefit of, at the direction of,
or in association with a criminal gang" to promote criminal conduct by gang); TEx.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(a) (West 1992) (stating that it is illegal to commit or conspire
to commit predicate crimes to establish, maintain, or participate in street gang). See also
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(F) (1992) (stating that it is illegal to promote criminal
syndicate to further street gang or its activities). Indiana and Iowa make gang participation
a felony; Georgia makes it a misdemeanor. IND. CODE ANN. § 35-45-9-3 (Burns 1993);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 723.A2 (West 1992). See GA. CODE ANN. § 16-15-4(a) (Michie
1992); supra note 195. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(F) (1992) (creating a
"class 2 felony"); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 609.229(3) (West 1992) (citing offense
classifications); TEx. PENAL CODE ANN. § 71.02(b),(c) (West 1992) (same). For
Louisiana's approach, see supra note 201.
203 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(A), (C) (1992); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 207.370,
207.400(d)-(h) (1991).
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that prohibits "leading organized crime. ' 204 Ohio had a syndicate statute
until 1980, when the Ohio Supreme Court held that it was unconstitution-
ally vague.2 °5
The Arizona Supreme Court upheld Arizona's statute against a similar
challenge in 1988.206 This statute makes it a crime to "participate in" or
"assist" a criminal syndicate,2 °7 which it defines as a "combination of
A Kentucky statute makes it a crime to commit any of seven specified acts to
"establish or maintain a criminal syndicate or to facilitate any of its activities." See KY.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.120(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (organizing or participating
in the organization syndicate or its activities; aid syndicate or its activities; manage or
direct syndicate activities; furnish legal, accounting or managerial services; commit,
conspire to commit, attempt to commit or be accomplice to a crime which a syndicate
commits). The statute defines "criminal syndicate" as five or more persons who
collaborate to "promote or engage in" any of certain specific crimes "on a continuing
basis." KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.120(3) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990). The specific
crimes are: extortion, prostitution, theft, illegal gambling, illegal trafficking in controlled
substances, liquor offenses, "destructive devices or booby traps," and "loan-sharking."
Id.
The Kentucky statute is actually a version of CCE that targets crimes other than drug
offenses. See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 506.120(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990); supra
part II.B.2.b. Of the seven acts that serve as predicates, two acts resemble conspiracy in
that they entail concerted action directed toward unlawful ends; but neither is a crime
in itself, so they only support liability for the criminal syndicate offense. See KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 506.120(1) (Michie/Bobbs-Merrill 1990) (organizing, participating in
organizing, managing, or directing syndicate or its activities). This outcome is identical
to that which ensues under CCE when a 21 U.S.C. § 846 (1988) conspiracy is used as
a predicate offense. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. Two other predicate
acts-providing aid or services to a syndicate or its activities-seem to impose aider and
abettor liability, since neither constitutes an offense in itself. See Brenner, supra note 48,
at 932-35, 965-66. These provisions are also consistent with federal law, which imposes
liability for aiding and abetting a CCE offense. See, e.g., United States v. Pino-Perez,
870 F.2d 1230, 1237 (7th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 901 (1989). Like
CCE's substantive predicates, the Kentucky statute's last three predicate acts encompass
conduct that is independently punishable under Kentucky's criminal code, so liability can
be imposed for these acts and for the criminal syndicate offense. Kentucky's method
parallels the result that ensues under CCE when crimes other than the 21 U.S.C. § 846
(1988) conspiracy are used as predicates. See supra note 85 and accompanying text. For
interpretations of this statute, see Cohoon v. Rees, 820 F.2d 784 (6th Cir. 1987); Cooper
v. Comm., 786 S.W.2d 875 (Ky. 1990); Comm. v. Phillips, 655 S.W.2d 6 (Ky. 1983),
cert. denied, 465 U.S. 1072 (1984); see also infra II.D.2.c. for a discussion of an
analogous New Jersey statute.
The Kentucky statute also bears some resemblance to the offense created by 18
U.S.C. § 1955 (1988). See supra note 81.
204 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-02 (1991).
205 See State v. Young, 406 N.E.2d 499, 504 (Ohio 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 905
(1981). See supra note 174.
206 See State v. Tocco, 750 P.2d 874, 878 (Ariz. 1988).
207 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(A), (C) (1992).
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persons or enterprises engaging, or having the purpose of engaging, on a
continuing basis" in one or more felonies under Arizona law.2"8 Arizona
adopts the federal definition of "enterprise" except for omitting "indi-
vidual" as a possibility, 9 and defines a "combination" as "persons
who collaborate" to carry out or promote a syndicate's activities.2 ° One
"participates" in a syndicate by doing any of the following: organizing,
managing, or financing it; inducing others to engage in violence or
intimidation to promote it; giving advice on conducting or financing its
affairs; inducing a public servant to violate an official duty to promote its
goals; or using a minor to commit an offense under the statute.2 1 One
''assists" a criminal syndicate by committing any felony "with the intent
to promote or further" its criminal objectives.21 2
Under North Dakota's statute, one "leads organized, crime" by
engaging in any of four activities that are directed at a "criminal
syndicate. ' 213 North Dakota uses the same definition of criminal syndicate
as Arizona,214 and the prohibited activities listed in the North Dakota
statute are identical to the first four varieties of conduct that constitute
"participating in a criminal syndicate" in Arizona.2t 5 The Arizona offense
was known as "leading organized crime" until 1990216 and probably
provided the model for the North Dakota statute. 217
208 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(C)(2) (1992) (referring to "any" felony under
Arizona law). See also Tocco, 750 P.2d at 877 (" '[C]ontinuing basis' refers to a course
of conduct involving a series of transactions over a period of time.").
209 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2301(C)(2), 13-2301(D)(2) (1992); see also supra
note 62 and accompanying text. See generally State v. Ivanhoe, 798 P.2d 410, 412 (Ariz.
1990) ("[D]efinition of enterprise that, while identical in all other respects to that used
in RICO, excludes 'individual.' ").
210 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(C)(1) (1992).
211 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(A) (1992).
212 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(C) (1992) (referring to acts "whether completed
or preparatory"). For the grading of both offenses, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2308(D)-(G) (1992), amended by S.B. 1049, 1993 Ariz. Legis. Serv. 255, § 32
(West).
213 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-02(1) (1991).
214 Compare N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-02 (1991) with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2301(C)(1)-(2) (1992).
215 See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-02(1) (1991) (organizing, managing or financing
syndicate; inducing violence or intimidation to further its goals; furnishing assistance or
direction in conducting or financing it; inducing violation of official duty to further its
goals); see also supra note 211.
216 See 1990 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 366, § 3 (amending ARIZ. REV STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2308(A)); 1991 Ariz. Sess. Laws, ch. 316, § 1 (amending ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2301(4)(m)). See generally infra part II.D.2.c.
217 Arizona adopted its leading organized crime statute in 1977. See 1977 Ariz. Sess.
Laws, ch. 142, § 82. North Dakota did not adopt its statute until 1983. See 1983 N.D.
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Nevada defines a "criminal syndicate" as a group of persons who
engage in, or intend to engage in, "racketeering activity. "218 "Racketeer-
ing activity" is the equivalent of federal law's pattern of racketeering
activity, i.e., committing at least two related predicate crimes. 2 9 A
companion statute lists the predicates.22 ° Substantively, Nevada's statute
is comparable to Arizona's, except that Nevada omits the reference to
using minors to commit the crime221 and adds a conspiracy provision.222
None of the syndicate statutes stand alone. Nevada and North Dakota
tie their statutes to RICO offenses, and Arizona's syndicate statute is
juxtaposed with RICO and gang provisions. 2 3 Therefore, further
consideration of these statutes will be resumed in the discussion of liability
configurations produced by combining RICO/CCE and comparable, non-
RICO/CCE statutes.224
c. Leading Organized Crime Statutes
Except for the North Dakota statute discussed above, only New Jersey
and Washington have statutes of this type.225 Washington's statute is the
more unusual of the two and thus is considered first.
Under the Washington statute, one leads organized crime by
organizing, by managing, or by financing "three or more persons with the
intent to engage in a pattern of criminal profiteering activity;" or by
inducing violence or intimidation to promote a pattern of criminal
Sess. Laws 163, § 2. Until 1985, Washington's "leading organized crime" offense
resembled the North Dakota crime. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010, Historical
Notes (West 1988); 1985 Wash. Sess. Laws, Ch. 455, § 7.
218 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.370 (Michie 1992). The group must be "so
structured" that it will "continue its operation even if individual members enter or leave
the organization." Id.
219 Id. § 207.390 (referring to "interrelated" and not "isolated incidents"). See, e.g.,
H. J. Inc. v. Northwestern Bell Tel. Co., 492 U.S. 229, 243-49 (1989); Sedima, S.P.R.L.
v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 499 (1985). The predicates are called "crime[s] related
to racketeering." NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.360 (Michie 1992).
220 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.360 (Michie 1992) (listing murder, manslaughter,
felony battery, kidnapping, sexual assault, arson, robbery, theft, extortion, forgery,
burglary, bribery, assault with a deadly weapon, embezzlement, perjury, various stolen
property, and other felonies).
221 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.400(l)(d)-(g) (Michie 1992).
222 NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.400(1)(h) (Michie 1992).
223 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.400 (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01 to
12.1-06.1-03 (1991); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN., tit. 13, ch. 23 ("Organized Crime and
Fraud") (1992).
224 See infra part II.D.2.d.
225 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2(g) (West 1982); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.060
(West 1992). See also supra part II.D.2.b.
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profiteering activity. 226 The statute defines a "pattern of criminal
profiteering activity" as committing "at least" three related acts of
criminal profiteering in five years. 227 "Criminal profiteering" consists of
committing any of twenty-seven specified offenses "for financial
gain.228
At first, this statute seems to prohibit attempts to commit substantive
RICO crimes, since it does not require that the pattern of criminal
profiteering activity be put to any unlawful end, and since the Washington
RICO statute makes it a crime to use such a pattern to affect an enterprise
in any of the ways forbidden by 18 U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(b). 229 But the RICO
statute explicitly prohibits attempts to commit its equivalents of § 1962(a)
or § 1962(c).23° If leading organized crime does not encompass completed
substantive RICO crimes or attempts to commit such crimes, it can only
address conduct taken to facilitate the commission of these offenses.
Traditionally, the nature of the liability imposed on one who sought to
facilitate an offense has depended on whether it was completed and if so,
by whom. If the offense was not completed, attempt liability is imposed
on the facilitator.3 If the offense was completed by the facilitator, she is
liable for the completed substantive crime.232 If it was completed by
someone other than the facilitator, she is liable as an aider and abettor of
the completed substantive crime.233 So far, criminal law does not impose
any distinct liability for the conduct involved in aiding and abetting a
substantive crime; instead, in a result reminiscent of that achieved by
applying the rule of merger to conspiracy, it imposes liability only for the
completed substantive crime.3
226 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.060(1) (West 1988). This statute is only in effect
until 1995. See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.903 (West 1988).
227 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(15) (West 1988). See supra note 72.
228 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(14) (West 1988) (specifying murder, robbery,
kidnapping, forgery, theft, child selling or buying, bribery, gambling, extortion, collecting
unlawful debt, drug crimes, dealing in stolen property, leading organized crime, money
laundering, obstructing justice, securities fraud, sexual exploitation of children,
pornography, prostitution, arson, and assault).
229 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.080 (West 1988). See also supra part II.B.2.a.
230 See WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.080(3) (West 1988). The federal statute does
not explicitly encompass attempts. See 18 U.S.C. § 1962 (1988).
231 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(3) (1985).
232 See generally MODEL PENAL CODE §§ 2.01 to 2.03 (1985).
233 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 2.06 (1985); 18 U.S.C. § 2 (1988).
234 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 977 n.324. See also PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note
42, at 757-58. The aiding and abetting principle described above is an ad hoc rule of
merger, which incorporates liability for the conduct used to facilitate commission of
substantive crimes into the liability imposed for those crimes. See id.
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Federal law imposes liability for aiding and abetting RICO offenses;
and Washington's statute might be intended to achieve a similar result-to
provide a means of reaching those who facilitate such offenses. 235 This
interpretation is undercut by Washington's RICO statute, which lists
leading organized crime as a predicate crime, the commission of which can
create a "pattern of criminal profiteering activity. ' 236 If leading organized
crime is a RICO predicate, it is a means of committing a RICO offense,
not merely a means of facilitating such an offense.237 Instead of imposing
aiding and abetting liability, the leading organized crime statute carves
another offense out of the conduct involved in committing a substantive
violation of Washington's RICO statute.238 Using this statute, a prosecutor
could pursue one who committed a RICO offense in concert with others
for conspiring to commit a substantive RICO crime, leading organized
crime, and actually committing the substantive RICO crime.239
At first glance, New Jersey's statute seems similar, making it an
offense to be a "leader of organized crime. "240 A leader of organized
crime "conspires with others as an organizer, supervisor or manager" to
commit a pattern of racketeering activity under the state RICO statute. 24,
Aside from adding a number of state offenses as predicate crimes, New
Jersey's RICO statute is almost identical to its federal counterpart.242
The leader of organized crime statute states that a conviction for that
offense does "not merge with the conviction of any other crime which
constitutes racketeering activity" under New Jersey law.243 This statement
clearly indicates an intent to impose some form of compound liability; the
unresolved issue is the nature and extent of that liability.
235 See, e.g., United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1132 n.68 (3d Cir. 1990), cert.
denied, 111 S. Ct. 2009 (1991) ("[B]eyond dispute that a RICO conviction may rest upon
the defendant's aiding and abetting of charged predicate offenses.").
236 WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.010(14)-(15) (West 1988). See also supra note
228.
237 See supra part II.B.2.a. Since leading organized crime is a RICO predicate, and
RICO predicates do not merge into a completed substantive RICO violation, liability can
be imposed both for the RICO violation and for leading organized crime as a predicate.
See id.
238 See supra note 119.
239 See supra note 119. For further consideration of this offense, see infra part II.D.2.d.
240 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2(g) (West 1982 & Supp. 1993).
241 Id. See also N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to 2C:41-2 (West 1982) (RICO statute).
242 See N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 2C:41-1 to 2C:41-2 (West 1982). The statute incorporates
all the predicates listed in 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1) (1988). See N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:41-1(a)(2) (West 1982); supra part II.B.2.a. The statute also includes versions of 18
U.S.C. § 1962(a)-(d) (1988). See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:41-2 (West 1982).
243 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2(g) (West 1992).
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The statute was developed to target "upper echelon members" of a
group engaged in racketeering activity.2 Instead of being part of the state
RICO statute, however, it appears in the statute that defines conspiracy 245
This placement and the explicit disavowal of merger strongly suggest that
the leader of organized crime offense is akin to CCE, a "super-conspir-
acy" aimed at criminal executives. 26 That construction is validated by the
provisions of other statutes which define the offenses of being a "leader
of [a] narcotics trafficking network" and a "leader of [an] auto theft
trafficking network. ' 247 These statutes specifically provide that neither
crime merges into "any offense which is the object of the conspiracy. ' 248
All three "leader" crimes are, therefore, CCE analogues, in that they
function as alternatives to a general conspiracy offense established
elsewhere in the criminal code. Like CCE, none of the "leader" crimes
merge into completed substantive offenses,2 49 but lesser conspiracy offenses
merge into them.25 ° What initially appears to be a product of serial
compounding is simply a more specific conspiracy provision.'
d. Permutations
Some states imitate federal law and use lateral compounding to
enhance the liability imposed by their versions of RICO and CCE.252 But
the most interesting uses of compound liability in state law occur in
Arizona and North Dakota, both of which link RICO statutes with other
provisions to create what could be a new order of tiered compounding.
Nevada has a superficially similar structure that actually has a far less
interesting effect.
244 See, e.g., State v. Alexander, 624 A.2d 48 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993).
245 See N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:5-2(g) (West 1992 & Supp. 1993).
246 See supra note 126.
247 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:35-3 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (narcotics); N.J. STAT. ANN.
§ 2C:20-18 (West 1992 & Supp. 1993) (auto theft). Like the leader of organized crime
offense, neither offense merges into a conviction for the substantive crime. See id.
248 id.
249 See supra note 84 and accompanying text.
250 See generally State v. Alexander, 624 A.2d 48, 50 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1993)
(leading a narcotics trafficking network versus "such lesser offenses as distributing or
conspiring to distribute a controlled dangerous substance").
251 The features noted above-placement in the state conspiracy statute, the disavowal
of merger, and explicit references to conspiracy in comparable provisions-clearly
differentiate this statute from the CCE-style gambling offense discussed in supra note 81.
252 See, e.g., R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-57-1 (1992) (stating that it is an offense to commit
violent crime to maintain or enhance position in racketeering enterprise); R.I. GEN. LAWS
§ 11-57-2 (1992) (stating that it is a crime to solicit this offense). For a comparable
federal provision, see supra note 135 and accompanying text.
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As noted earlier, Arizona makes it a crime to participate in or assist a
criminal syndicate.253 It also has equivalents of the three RICO substantive
offenses.254 One commits the RICO offenses by using "racketeering or its
proceeds" to control or conduct an enterprise.2 ' Arizona's statute uses the
federal definition of "enterprise" except for excluding individuals as an
option. 256 It substitutes "any act" of racketeering for the federal statute's
pattern of racketeering activity and defines "racketeering" as a "prepar-
atory or completed offense" that is committed "for financial gain" and
involves specified predicate crimes.257
Participating in a criminal syndicate is one of the predicate crimes.258
Since participating in a criminal syndicate is itself a crime, 259 and RICO
predicates do not merge with a substantive RICO offense, it seems that
the act(s) by which one "participates" in a criminal syndicate
simultaneously generate liability for that crime and for a RICO violation
if they are used to conduct or control an enterprise. Unlike the New
Jersey offense considered earlier,26 ° participating in a criminal syndicate
seems to be a substantive crime distinct from those created by the state's
RICO statute. 26' This conclusion results from parsing the elements of the
two statutes:
253 See supra part II.D.2.b.
254 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312(a)-(b) (1992). The statute does not include a
version of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d) (1988), but conspiracy to commit RICO crimes may be
addressed through Arizona's general conspiracy statute. See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §
13-1003(a) (1992). No reported cases discuss conspiracy to violate the state's RICO
statute.
255 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312(a)-(b) (1992).
256 See supra note 209.
257 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4) (1992) (stating that predicate crimes
include homicide, robbery, kidnapping, forgery, theft, bribery, gambling, usury, extortion,
drug crimes, trafficking in explosives, weapons or stolen property, the syndicate crime,
obstructing justice, false claims, fraud, obscenity, prostitution, restraint of trade, terrorism,
money laundering, and obscene telephone communications to minors for commercial
purposes).
258 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(D)(4)(m) (1992). See also supra note 257.
259 Cf. supra note 203 (Kentucky CCE statute).
260 See supra part II.D.2.c.
261 See supra note 223 and accompanying text.
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Induce breach of duty
262
Focus: "Syndicate"- "Enterprise" 263-
Combination engaging or Corporation
intending to engage in Partnership
one or more felonies264  Association
Labor union
Group of persons
Predicate: Any felony265  Specified felonies
Except for inducing violence and breach of trust, which could be
encompassed by RICO's homicide and bribery predicates, the conduct
used to commit the crimes is distinct.266 For the syndicate crime, it is
facilitating the organized commission of any two felonies; in other words,
the syndicate exists to commit these crimes. 267 For RICO, on the other
hand, the predicate crime is a tool used to conduct or control an enterprise;
instead of the enterprise's existing to commit the crime, the crime is used
to exploit the enterprise.268
Admittedly, there can be some overlap between the two, because the
RICO predicates are a subset of the felonies that can serve as objectives
for a criminal syndicate, 269 and because a syndicate could qualify as a
RICO enterprise. 270 Despite the empirical replication of some elements, the
262 See supra note 211 and accompanying text. The final option is using a minor in
violating one of the provisions noted above. See id.
264 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2301(C)(2) (1992).
263 See supra note 62.
265 See supra note 208.
266 See supra note 211 and accompanying text. See also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2301(D)(4)(y) (1992) (Note that the predicate offense of terrorism is another
possibility.).
267 See supra part II.D.2.b.
268 See supra part II.B.2.a.
269 Compare supra note 257 with supra note 208.
270 Like Arizona's criminal syndicate, an enterprise can consist of a group of persons
associated together for unlawful ends. See supra note 62; see also supra note 139.
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statutes may not necessarily define these as distinct offenses.271 The
relationship these crimes actually bear to each other can be illustrated by
means of an example.
Assume, therefore, that six persons-Roe, Doe, Grey, Black, Green, and
White-used the following conduct, committed in Arizona, to establish and
operate an organization analogous to a Mafia-style crime family: 27 2
distributing marijuana, possessing marijuana with intent to distribute,
bribery, extortion, and murder.273 Can this conduct be used to impose
liability for participating in a criminal syndicate and for violating the state
RICO statute? It can, using the above analysis.
Assume that the six individuals united in 1990 to sell marijuana. As
that is a felony under Arizona law, the group qualified as a "criminal
syndicate. ' 274 Roe and Doe organized it, thereby "participating" in this
syndicate. 275 Grey and Black contributed money from drug crimes
perpetrated on their own as its initial working capital; by financing it they,
too, participated in the syndicate. 276 Green and White participated by
serving as the syndicate s managers and using threats of violence to coerce
marijuana suppliers into cooperating with it.277 Also, all six individuals
- engaged in conduct involving the distribution of marijuana that constituted
various felonies under Arizona law.278
The syndicate was doing so well by the beginning of 1992 that the six
members expanded their operation. Among other things, they assassinated
two rivals to acquire their business, and then bribed law enforcement
officers to avert a rigorous investigation of the rivals' deaths.279 The
members also continued to buy and sell marijuana. 28 0 All of these acts
constituted felonies under Arizona law and predicate crimes under
Arizona's RICO statute.28'
271 See, e.g., supra part II.D.2.a. (referring to replication in Browne).
272 See supra note 139 and accompanying text.
273 This example is based on the federal prosecution hypothesized in supra part II.D. 1.
See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405 (1992) (stating that it is a felony to use,
possess, transport, sell, or offer to sell marijuana).
274 See supra note 273; see also supra part II.D.2.b.
275 See supra part II D.2.b.
276 See id.
277 See id; see also ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1804(A) (1992). The discussion
implicitly assumes that others were involved in the syndicate's activities.
278 See, e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-3405 (1992) (stating that it is a felony to use,
possess, transport, sell, or offer to sell marijuana).
279 See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1105(A) (1992) (murder); ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2602(A) (1992) (bribery of public servant).
280 See supra note 273.
281 See supra note 257.
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As noted above, Roe, Doe, Grey, Black, Green, and White can be
convicted of participating in a criminal syndicate based on the acts each
committed while establishing that organization.282 They are also liable for
the drug crimes it perpetrated,283 and for RICO violations resulting from
their 1992-1993 activities. The syndicate constitutes an enterprise under
284 th coArizona's RICO statute, and the conduct described in the preceding
paragraph supports liability for substantive RICO charges because the six
members used their marijuana transactions to maintain control of the
enterprise,2 85 and used the assassinations and acts of bribery to conduct its
affairs.286
This example splits the conduct at issue into two time periods to make
it easier to see how these statutes can work in conjunction with each other.
The syndicate members' 1990-1992 conduct is used to impose liability for
participating in a criminal syndicate and for the drug crimes perpetrated by
that syndicate. 287 Their 1992-1993 conduct is used to hold them liable for
two substantive RICO offenses plus the predicate crimes for those
offenses, i.e., the homicides, acts of bribery, and drug offenses committed
during that period. In addition, although Arizona's RICO statute does not
212 See supra part II.D.2.b.
283 See supra part II.C.
284 See supra note 270 and accompanying text.
28 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312(A) (1992) ("A person commits illegal
control of an enterprise if such person, through racketeering or its proceeds.., maintains
... control of any enterprise.").
286 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2312(B) (1992) ("A person commits illegally
conducting an enterprise if such person . . . conducts such enterprise's affairs through
racketeering.").
287 Arizona's statute also makes it a crime to assist a criminal syndicate, but it is likely
that this offense is intended to merge into the "participating" offense. Compare ARIZ.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(D)-(E) (1992) ("participating" offense is class 2 felony)
with ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(G) (1992) ("assisting" offense is class 4 felony).
The statute contains a separate provision specifying that it is a class 2 felony to commit
a "participating" offense "for the benefit of, at the direction of or in association with
any criminal street gang, with the intent to promote, further or assist any criminal conduct
by the gang." ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(F) (1992). A "[c]riminal street gang"
is "a criminal syndicate which is composed of three or more persons and which engages
in," or is intended to engage in, drug or violent felonies. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2301(A)(2) (1992). One could argue that this is a separate offense from the
"participatory" offense, and that the six defendants described above can be held liable
for participating in a "generic" criminal syndicate and for participating in a criminal
street gang, since their syndicate was composed of more than three persons and engaged
in both drug and violent felonies. While the statute creates the possibility that these could
be separate offenses, this seems unlikely. Compare ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(F)
(1992) (participating in street gang is offense is class 2 felony) with ARIZ. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 13-2308(D)-(E) (1992) (stating that "generic" participation offense is class 2
felony).
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include a conspiracy provision, the general conspiracy statute can
presumably be used to impose liability for conspiracy to commit the
substantive RICO crimes, as well as for conspiracy to commit the drug
crimes, assassinations, and acts of bribery.288 It might also be possible to
use this statute to impose liability for conspiring to participate in a
criminal syndicate.289
Because this example used temporally distinct conduct to impose
liability under the two statutes, it suggests that the statutes derive from
serial compounding, which splits a course of conduct into sequential
offenses. 290 The same facts can, however, be used to assemble a charge
configuration which indicates that they are actually the products of a new
approach to tiered compounding.
Similar to its federal counterpart, Arizona's RICO statute is the result
of tiered compounding.29' One commits a substantive crime under the latter
by using "racketeering or its proceeds" to have a proscribed effect on an
29229enterprise. Statutes like this impose two tiers of liability.293 If one uses
racketeering or its proceeds to manipulate an enterprise, she becomes liable
for the first-tier, predicate crime(s) that constitute(s) racketeering and for
the RICO violation, a second-tier, derivative crime produced by using the
predicates to manipulate an enterprise.294 The syndicate statute can be used
to add a third tier of liability. 295
The RICO statute makes it an offense to use specified crimes to
manipulate an enterprise; 296 the syndicate statute makes it an offense to
facilitate the operations of a criminal syndicate which exists to commit any
Arizona felony.297 The syndicate statute could, therefore, be used to impose
an additional level of liability for conduct that facilitated the operations of
a criminal syndicate that has committed RICO violations.298 This approach
288 See supra note 254.
289 See generally lannelli v. United States, 420 U.S. 770, 790-91 (1975) (upholding
liability for offense comparable to Arizona criminal syndicate crime). See also supra note
81.
290 See supra note 119 and accompanying text.
291 See supra part II.C.
292 See supra note 255 and accompanying text.
293 See supra part II.C.
294 See supra note 254 and accompanying text; see also supra part II.C.
295 See Brenner, supra note 2, at 972-78 (proposing such a statute).
296 See, e.g., supra note 255 and accompanying text.
297 See supra note 208 and accompanying text. This attribute of the Arizona syndicate
statute distinguishes the Arizona syndicate statute from New Jersey's "leader of
organized crime" statute, since the latter is RICO-specific and the former is not. See
supra part II.D.2.c.
298 The grading of the offenses provides inferential support for this use of the syndicate
statute, as it is a class 2 felony while the RICO offenses are class 3 felonies. Compare
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would make the six persons whose activities were described above liable
for the following:
Third-tier offense
participating in a criminal syndicate
that committed RICO violations
Second-tier offenses
using marijuana and extortion offenses to establish
and maintain control of an enterprise
using assassinations, bribery, and marijuana offenses
to conduct the affairs of an enterprise
First-tier offenses
distributing marijuana




In this charge configuration the marijuana, bribery, extortion, and
homicide crimes are the predicates for the RICO violations, which become
the predicates of the syndicate offense. Just as first-tier predicates do not
merge into a second-tier offense, these second-tier RICO predicates do not
merge into the third-tier syndicate offense.2 99
No reported cases indicate that Arizona's syndicate statute has been
used to achieve third-tier liability or was intended to achieve this effect.300
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-2308(D)-(F) (1992) with ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 13-2312(D) (1992). This suggests that the syndicate statute defines a "greater"
offense. See generally ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-601 (1992) (creating offense
hierarchy).
299 See supra part II.C. The syndicate statute is used to impose a separate third-tier
liability for the conduct used to facilitate the commission of the second-tier RICO
crimes. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 977 n.324; see also supra note 234 and
accompanying text.
" One can use the status of the syndicate offense as a RICO predicate to dispute the
permissibility of this effect. See supra note 258 and accompanying text. While this may
suggest that the offense was not designed to be used as described above, it does not
necessarily establish that it cannot be used in this fashion-just as the status of the
syndicate crime as a "greater" felony does not conclusively establish that it was
intended to impose third-tier liability. See supra note 298. Although the criminal law has
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As the charge configuration sketched above illustrates, it can be applied to
this end, as can North Dakota's almost identical "leading organized
crime" statute.3° 1
Nevada's statutes do not create any possibility of third-tier liability.
Nevada's syndicate offense resembles the Arizona crime, but is codified
with the state RICO provisions, which recapitulate 18 U.S.C. § 1962.302
Unlike Arizona, Nevada defines a syndicate as an organization that
engages in or intends to engage in a pattern of racketeering activity, which
conflates a syndicate's activities with those used to commit RICO
offenses. 303 The RICO/syndicate statute makes it a crime to conspire to
commit either offense, °4 so the syndicate provisions cannot define a
conspiracy offense and must create a new substantive crime.30 5
Nevada's syndicate offense statute makes it a crime to engage in a
pattern of racketeering activity, as well as to use such a pattern to
manipulate an enterprise.30 6 Presumably, this is a RICO attempt provision,
since it reaches conduct that could be used against an enterprise before it
has been put to this purpose. 307 By not requiring such a contemplated use,however, it also creates the independent offenses of facilitating the
traditionally treated "greater" and "lesser" offenses as categorical entities, this system
breaks down with the emergence of compound liability. See Brenner, supra note 2, at 951-
48; supra note 298. The syndicate offense could, therefore, have been designed to function
in both the capacities outlined in the text above, i.e., as a precursor offense in the first
scenario and as a third-tier offense in the second.
Of course, the syndicate crime may well be a product of serial compounding, meant
to be used only as described in the first scenario presented in this section. See supra text
accompanying note 298. It is equally possible that this discussion reads more into the
structure of these statutes than was ever intended.
301 For a comparison of the statutes, see supra part II.D.2.b. Like Arizona, North
Dakota makes its offense a RICO predicate. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(2)(d)(12)
(1991); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-02 (1991). See supra note 300. Unlike Arizona,
it makes leading organized crime and substantive RICO violations felonies of the
same grade. See N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-06.1-01(3) (1991); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-06.1-03(3) (1991). Cf. supra note 298.
302 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.390, 207.400(1) (Michie 1992); see supra part
II.D.2.b.
303 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.370 (Michie 1992); see also supra part II.D.2.b.
The syndicate crime is not a RICO predicate. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.360,
207.390 (Michie 1992).
304 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 207.400(1)(h) (Michie 1992).
305 Cf. supra part II.D.2.c (New Jersey statute).
306 See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 207.390, 207.400(1)(a)-(h) (Michie 1992).
307 Some states outlaw attempts to commit RICO offenses, but the federal statute does
not include such a provision. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 895.03(4) (1992); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 1353(D) (West 1992); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 166.720(4) (1991); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 9A.82.080(3) (West 1992); see also supra part II.B.2.a.
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activities of a group that engages in a pattern of racketeering activity and
that conspires to this end.3°8
The Nevada RICO/syndicate statute, therefore, creates seven offenses:
three substantive RICO crimes, conspiring to commit one or more
substantive RICO crimes, attempting to commit one or more substantive
RICO crimes, facilitating the activities of a group engaged in a pattern of
racketeering activity per se, and conspiring to facilitate the activities of
such a group. Attempts merge into a completed offense, so the attempt
crime is an alternative to substantive RICO charges.30 9 The last two crimes
should be used only when persons engage in racketeering activity for its
own sake, not to commit substantive RICO crimes; it is highly improbable
that these offenses are products of serial compounding designed to be used
in conjunction with substantive RICO charges, since the conduct they
encompass is subsumed by a completed RICO offense.1 ° Instead of
imposing an additional layer of liability, the Nevada statute merely creates
a new second-tier offense, engaging in a pattern of racketeering activity
per se.
e. Observations
It seems that like the RICO/CCE clones, idiosyncratic state products
of tiered compounding are reactions to a perceived threat posed by
organized crime. The gang statutes address a specific, identifiable threat;
the syndicate and leading organized crime statutes are directed against
more amorphous entities, but share the former's concern with the dangers
of concerted criminal action. The next section speculates as to why tiered
compounding and its products are the weapons of choice against this
perceived peril.
III. WHY IS "THE PROSECUTION ARM" DOING THIS?
This section could be captioned "WHY ARE WE DOING THIS?", since
the statutes described in the preceding sections are not solely attributable
to the efforts of prosecutors, though the uses to which the statutes are
being put are attributable to prosecutors. The section heading refers to
prosecutors because it is reasonable to assume that even if prosecutors are
not the only force driving the expansion of compound liability, they exert
'0' See sipra note 304 and accompanying text. See generally N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 75D-4(a)(1) (1991) (stating that it is a "civil offense" to "engage in a pattern of
racketeering activity").
'09 For the merger of attempts, see supra note 49. See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 193.330
(Michie 1991).
30 See, e.g., supra note 119; see supra part II.B.l.
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the most influence over the process.3 ' Therefore, a logical means of
identifying causes of this expansion is to consider the advantages
compound liability offers prosecutors, on the premise that such advantages
will indicate the extent to which prosecutors have an incentive to promote
the adoption and use of such liability.
Before embarking on this venture a caveat is in order. The suggestions
which follow are merely that-speculations intended to provoke discussion
and deliberation about a still extraordinary phenomenon; these comments
may or may not account for the rise and spread of this singular approach
to criminal liability. They are offered to call attention to this almost
overlooked process in the hopes that whatever compound liability's future
course may be, it will be shaped by reflection rather than expediency.
A. Because It Can
The most simple explanation for the rise of compound liability avoids
any need to inquire into the benefits it offers prosecutors. It may well be
that no deliberative processes are responsible for the recent explosion of
this type of liability, that it is a purely ad hoc phenomenon precipitated by
the adoption of RICO and CCE in 1970. Perhaps these statutes acclimated
prosecutors to using a very different model of criminal liability, and their
habituation to those uses led prosecutors to seek new and different ways
to employ this type of liability.
Something like this certainly occurred at the federal level. As noted
earlier, RICO, which is by far the more complex of the two statutes, was
almost ignored for the first decade of its existence because prosecutors had
not learned how to use it.312 Once prosecutors did learn how to use RICO,
federal RICO cases exploded.313 CCE, too, is now more widely used, and
used in conjunction with RICO, although its limited scope ensures that
RICO and RICO/CCE prosecutions will always outnumber CCE-only
prosecutions.3t 4
The increased use of these statutes seems more the product of
heightened familiarity than calculated effect. The inadvertence of this
3' See, e.g., H.R. REP. NO. 966, 87th Cong., 1st Sess. (1961), reprinted in 1961
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2664, 2666 (letter from Attorney General Robert Kennedy accompanying
his proposal for what would become the Travel Act). See supra note 64; see also Bradley,
supra note 6, at 242-54.
312 See, e.g., Dennis, supra note 5, at 653.
313 Id. ("In 1983 and 1984 an explosion of RICO cases occurred that is still being
felt.").
314 See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REv. 781, 790




expanded application of RICO and CCE is supported by the provisions of
the CFCE statute, adopted in 1990. 311 Credited to the savings and loan
scandal, it is a white-collar version of CCE.316 Instead of using extant or
new methods of compounding to craft a provision uniquely tailored to
combat the evils that prompted its adoption, Congress simply cloned
CCE.317 This cloning process lends inferential credence to the premise that
the federal escalation of compound liability, in principle and in practice,
has not been a deliberative process. If this is true of federal law, then it is
likely to be true of state law, since the latter's ventures into compound
liability are based on models devised by federal law.
318
It may be that America's experience with compound liability has so far
been a process of reacting to the consequences of an event analogous to
Aladdin's releasing the genie from the bottle, or perhaps to Pandora's
releasing a multitude of ills from the box given her by Zeus. If this
interpretation is accurate, then no answer yet exists to the question posed
at the beginning of this section.
B. Because Organized Crime Remains a Perceived Threat
One can make a credible argument that the rise of compound liability
in American law is a reaction to the threat posed by organized crime,
whether actual or perceived. 3 9 At the federal level, this reaction provided
the impetus for the adoption of RICO and CCE, and much of the earlier,
common law expansion of compound liability was prompted by the
proliferation of gang activity during and after Prohibition.32° Many states
adopted RICO/CCE statutes because of a perceived threat posed by new
varieties of organized crime.321
One problem with this argument is that very few federal or state RICO
cases are brought against groups that conform to the conventional image
of "organized crime. '3 22 Since CCE can be used only against drug
traffickers, it is admittedly less problematic in this regard-of course, it is
315 See supra part II.B.2.c.
316 Id.
317 id.
318 See supra part II.D.2.
319 See supra part II.B.
320 See Bradley, supra note 6, at 213-25; see, e.g., supra note 184.
321 See supra part II.D.2.
322 See supra note 60; see also Russell D. Leblang, Controlling Prosecutorial
Discretion Under State RICO, 24 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 79, 82 (1990); Lynch, RICO: The
Crime of Being a Criminal, Parts III & IV, supra note 6, at 920; see, e.g., Terra
Resources I v. Burgin, 664 F. Supp. 82, 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (referring to "flood" of
RICO cases "which have nothing at all to do with organized crime as it is understood
commonly or was understood by Congress at the time of the enactment of the statute").
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used much less often for that very reason.3 23 But if RICO and statutes
modeled after it were developed as responses to organized crime, should
that not be their primary use? If that is not their primary use, can the
expansion of compound liability be ascribed to concerns about organized
crime?
If it is attributable to such concerns, the future will almost certainly see
an even greater increase in the use and varieties of compound liability.
This reasonably reliable forecast is based on congressional and other
inquiries which report that gang activity, especially international gang
activity, is increasing rapidly and presents new challenges for law
enforcement.324 Whether this is true or not is less important than whether
the perception that it is true takes hold and prompts further expansions of
compound liability. Of course, if RICO, CCE, and their extant brethren are
such admirable weapons against organized crime, one wonders why they
have not been more effective against this threat.
If this threat, or this perceived threat, is the driving force behind
compound liability, the answer to the question posed by this section must
be that "the prosecution arm" is doing this because what was once
regarded as simple street crime is now perceived as a manifestation of
organized crime and must be treated as such. One of many problems with
this answer, and with the interpretation that gave rise to it, is that no
principled way seems to exist to distinguish between organized and
individual crime, or among gradations of organized crime. As others have
noted, RICO and its progeny let prosecutors define almost any conduct as
organized crime and pursue it as such. 325 Even if one assumes that this
flexibility is an essential aspect of using products of tiered compounding
against complex criminal activity, it is difficult to believe that all criminal
behavior has attained, or will attain, sufficient complexity to warrant its
being pursued by this means. The organized crime rationale seems to beget
323 See supra part II.B.2.b.
324 See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S8309-01 (daily ed. June 20, 1991) (statement of Sen.
Specter introducing "bill to implement a Federal crime control and law enforcement
program to stem gang violence"); 137 CONG. REC. S1368-01 (daily ed. Jan. 31, 1991)
(statement of Sen. Deconcini introducing "a bill to enhance the Federal Government's
authority and ability to eliminate violent crime committed by outlaw street and motorcycle
gangs"); Douglas Frantz, Chasing a New Type of Mob, L.A. TIMES, May 20, 1991, at
Al; PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON ORGANIZED CRIME, THE IMPACT: ORGANIZED CRIME
TODAY 33-128 (1986) (stating that groups then active in United States included Mafia,
oriental tongs and triads, outlaw motorcycle gangs, Columbian cartels, Japanese Yakuza,
Jamaican Posses, Russian, Irish, Cuban, Vietnamese, and Canadian gangs).
325 See, e.g., United States v. Dennis, 458 F. Supp. 197 (E.D. Mo. 1978) (a RICO




a very real potential for inflating the use of compound liability, or at least
the use of tiered compounding, beyond the needs of necessity or justice.326
The proponents of these statutes contend that this is not a cause for
concern because the decision to bring such charges is in the hands of
responsible prosecutors and often entails a review process which guards
against abuse.327 Most state provisions do not, however, require such a
review process.328 Even if provisions did, the organized crime rationale is
sufficiently amorphous to leave a significant potential for abuse. If
compound liability is in fact needed to combat the encroachments of
organized crime, it is still reasonable to believe that simple liability can
serve a useful role in the American criminal justice system. Compound
liability gives rise to weapons of sufficient magnitude that its evolution
should be overseen by persons other than those who, as the next section
points out, markedly benefit from its implementation.329
C. Because Compound Liability Increases Prosecutor Control Over
Criminal Proceedings
A number of authors have noted that prosecutors are exerting increased
control over the criminal justice process, one going so far as to suggest
that this control has made "the adversary system almost obsolete. ' 330
Prosecutors have traditionally exercised "virtually unlimited" discretion
in bringing charges.33' Compound liability gives them even more latitude
in exercising this discretion.332
326 See, e.g., Sedima v. Imrex Co., Inc., 473 U.S. 479, 503 (1985) ("[R]esponsible use
of prosecutorial discretion is particularly important with respect to criminal RICO
prosecutions ... given the extremely severe penalties authorized.").
327 See, e.g., Coffey, supra note 71, at 1043 ("All RICO prosecutions.., brought by
the Department of Justice must first be reviewed and approved for filing by the Criminal
Division's Organized Crime and Racketeering Section.").
328 See, e.g., Leblang, supra note 322, at 92 (stating that states have "no review
mechanism comparable to that which exists at the federal level"). But see N.Y. CRIM.
PRoc. LAW § 200.65 (McKinney 1988) (Prosecutor must state that "he has reviewed the
substance of the evidence presented to the grand jury and concurs ... that the [RICO]
charge is consistent with" legislative findings prompting adoption of the statute).
329 See generally H.R. REP. NO. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 85 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4652 (additional views of Moss, Dingell, Adams & Eckhardt)
("Unfortunately, prosecutor's discretion is sometimes like the discretion of the hound on
the scent of the hare.").
330 Bennett L. Gershman, Symposium: The New Prosecutors, 53 U. PITT. L. REv. 393,
315 (1992). See also Genego, supra note 314, at 853; Leblang, supra note 322, at 81.
33' Kenneth J. Melilli, Prosecutorial Discretion in an Adversary System, 1992 B.Y.U.
L. REv. 669, 672.
332 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 330, at 411 (RICO and CCE provide "greater
prosecutorial flexibility to join parties and crimes" and make "convictions more
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Among other things, prosecutors can use statutes like RICO and CCE
to construct charges that provide a significant incentive for plea bargaining,
as they would impose varying degrees of iterative liability if a defendant
were to insist on going to trial.333 RICO and CCE give a prosecutor the
ability to craft charges that allow her to use otherwise inadmissible
evidence 34 and to use one defendant's conduct against others who may
have been peripherally involved in the activity at issue.335 Federally, RICO
and CCE have spawned the "megatrial," a "gargantuan criminal trial"
involving "numerous defendants, a myriad of varying charges and
disparate criminal acts, a vast number of witnesses and exhibits, and an
accompanying large number of defense counsel." '336 Defense attorneys
contend that prosecutors exploit RICO and CCE to produce megatrials that
enhance the advantages noted above, as well as producing others.337
These advantages arguably skew "the balance of power in the
adversary system" in favor of the prosecution.338 They clearly provide an
incentive for prosecutors to employ the products of compound liability, and
likely."); Marcus, supra note 6, at 16 (RICO "significantly broadened the scope of the
government's authority to bring defendants together in one indictment."); id. at 17
(quoting letter from Phillip E. Johnson, Professor of Law, University of California,
'[A]ll of the opportunities for abuse and excess have been magnified in RICO.' ").
31 See, e.g., Marcus, supra note 6, at note 89 (quoting letter from Abner J. Mikva,
Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, District of Columbia Circuit, RICO
"substantially affected the way that criminal charges are drawn, bargained over, and
tried."); see also supra part II.D.1.
334 See, e.g., Leblang, supra note 322, at 87 (referring to "introduction of evidence to
prove the existence of the enterprise that would normally be excluded as evidence of prior
bad acts"); see also Giuliani, Legal Remedies for Attacking Organized Crime, reprinted
in NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, MAJOR ISSUES IN ORGANIZED CRIME 103, 106 (1988)
(RICO "permits proof of the defendant's whole life of crime.").
335 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 330, at 410 ("[I]n a long and complex case, it is
virtually impossible for jurors to compartmentalize proof against individual defendants.");
see also id. (referring to use of evidence against "major players" and "likelihood of
,spillover taint' to convict "minor participants").
336 Gershman, supra note 330, at 410. See also Marcus, supra note 6, at 37 (referring
to 320 counts tried; indictment originally contained over 700 counts). The prosecution
described in the Introduction is, if not a megatrial, a lesser variety of this phenomenon.
See supra part I.
331 See, e.g., Gershman, supra note 330, at 410-11:
'[T]here are conspiracies within conspiracies, and conspiracies to conceal
other conspiracies, conspiracies which are discrete and finite, and those which
are amorphous and indefinite, involving conspirators joining and leaving the
conspiracy at various times.' Asking jurors to make such factual distinctions
over the course of many months 'would be virtually impossible without the
aid of a computer.'
(quoting United States v. Gallo, 668 F. Supp. 736, 751-52 (E.D.N.Y. 1987)).
338 Genego, supra note 314, at 819.
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may also provide an inducement for them to seek an expansion in the
available universe of those products. Indeed, one reason for the rise of
compound liability may be that it lets prosecutors at least partially avoid
procedural constraints that appeared when criminal trials became an
adversary process. 339 The evolution of compound liability, beginning with
the demise of merger in conspiracy prosecutions, can be seen as a
spontaneous reaction to the restrictions imposed by the rules of evidence
and the limitations of charging in a system of simple liability, as a means
of ensuring that the jury is given as complete a picture as possible of the
conduct actually attributed to the defendant(s).34 °
However accurate this speculation may be, compound liability ob-
viously increases prosecutor control over criminal proceedings. One answer
to the question posed by this section is, therefore, that "the prosecution
arm" is doing this because by using compound liability the prosecution
secures advantages that diminish the adversary character of a prosecution.
D. Because It Ensures Adequate Punishment
Compound liability is no doubt popular because it is a means of
ensuring that the punishment imposed for a course of conduct is
commensurate with the evils produced thereby. Compounding offense
liability permits the imposition of punishment for several distinct crimes,
all arising from the same conduct.3 4 ' This aspect of RICO and CCE is
responsible for their being incorrectly characterized as penalty enhance-
ment provisions, rather than substantive crimes.342
"9 See, e.g., Stephan Landsman, The Rise of the Contentious Spirit: Adversary
Procedure in Eighteenth Century England, 75 CORNELL L. REV. 497, 603 (1990) ("To
ensure the probity of the process prosecutors were restrained in a variety of ways.");
John H. Langbein, The Criminal Trial Before the Lawyers, 45 U. CHI. L. REV. 263, 306
(1978) (stating that rules of evidence were devised to control lawyers in adversarial
proceeding); see also id. at 315 ("[W]ell into the eighteenth century" English criminal
trials "resembled the modem Continental more than the modem Anglo-American
procedure.").
" It may be a pragmatic effort to recover, in part, the experience of trying criminal
charges to a jury possessing some degree of personal knowledge about the defendant
and/or her alleged crime. See generally GEOFFREY GILBERT, THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 95
(photo. reprint 1979) (Garland Publishing Inc. 1754) ("Jury of their own Knowledge may
have further Light in the Fact than what they have from the Witness in Court.");
THOMAS A. GREEN, VERDICT ACCORDING TO CONSCIENCE 245 (1985) (stating that jurors
relied on private knowledge as late as the eighteenth century); J.B. THAYER, A
PRELIMINARY TREATISE ON EVIDENCE AT THE COMMON LAW 90 (1898) (stating that
medieval jurors were "likely to be already informed" about a case).
"' See supra part II.C.
342 See supra part II.C.
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A less overt aspect of the punitive nature of compound liability is that
it conforms to the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel and
unusual punishment. By "stacking" offense liability to secure an
appropriate quantum of punishment, it permits the imposition of significant
penalties in a manner that is not likely to run afoul of the proportionality
guarantee the Supreme Court has identified as part of the Eighth
Amendment's prohibition.343 Under this guarantee, too much punishment
for an offense is violative of the Amendment.3"
Compound liability, however, provides a means of avoiding this
principle, since a specified quantum of punishment is being imposed for
a collection of discrete offenses, all of which are predicated on the same
conduct, rather than for one offense. Punishment that might well be
considered disproportionate for one crime is unlikely to be held
disproportionate when it is imposed for several crimes, particularly when
it is imposed for several different crimes.345
This facet of compound liability has seldom been litigated,346 and has
received no scholarly attention. It has undoubtedly been a minor theme in
the growing acceptance of compound liability, but it is nonetheless a
significant aspect of that liability, one which is likely to become even more
so if compound liability continues to flourish. Applied to the question
posed at the beginning of this section, this attribute of compound liability
suggests that "the prosecution arm" is doing this to obtain substantial
penalties that withstand proportionality reviews.
IV. CONCLUSION
I fear we have created a monster and will live to regret it.347
To appreciate the extent to which compound liability has successfully
infiltrated American law, it is only necessary to consider compound
liability's status in the nation whose common law was the source of
143 See Solem v. Helm, 463 U.S. 277, 292 (1983); see, e.g., United States v. Phillips,
664 F.2d 971, 1043 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 457 U.S. 1136 (1982) (same); United
States v. Darby, 744 F.2d 1508, 1525 (1 1th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1100 (1985)
(an unsuccessful proportionality challenge to CCE sentences).
314 See, e.g., Darby, 744 F.2d at 1525.
315 See, e.g., Vickery v. State, 539 So. 2d 499, 501-03 (Fla. Ct. App. 1989) (rejecting
argument that sentences imposed under Florida RICO statute were disproportionate
because it acted to enhance the penalties for the predicate crimes).
346 Id.
347 Marcus, supra note 6, at 17 (quoting letter from Phillip E. Johnson, Professor of
Law, University of California, referring to RICO).
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American criminal law.348 Basically, compound liability does not exist in
Great Britain.349
The codification of criminal law is a recent phenomenon in Great
Britain, much of it occurring in the last three decades.35 ° Until then,
England relied heavily on common law crimes and defenses.35'
Codification eliminated felony-murder, the only common law crime to
implicate compound liability.3 52 It also discouraged the only other means
of compounding liability-combining liability for conspiracy with liability
for substantive crimes resulting from a conspiracy.
In 1976, the Law Commission, created to reform British law, issued a
report on conspiracy.353 Conceding that conspiracy does not merge with
completed substantive crimes, the Commission noted that conspiracy
charges were "frequently brought in cases where the object of the
agreement ... has been achieved. ' 354 It concluded, however, that joining
charges for conspiracy with charges for the substantive crimes resulting
from a conspiracy could undermine the fairness of criminal trials. 355 The
Commission recommended that if "an indictment contains substantive
counts and a related conspiracy count, the prosecution should be required
to justify the joinder to the judge or, failing justification, to elect whether
to proceed on the substantive or conspiracy counts.
356
In 1977, this recommendation became a directive addressed to judges
hearing criminal proceedings. 357 The directive influenced the Code for
Crown Prosecutors, which cautions that
348 See, e.g., WAYNE R. LAFAVE & AUSTIN W. SCOTT, JR., CRIMINAL LAW § 2.1(c) (2d
ed. 1986) (stating that English common law was first American criminal law).
34' But see ANDREW ASHWORTH, PRINCIPLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 288-90 (1991) (stating
that "public order offences" added in 1986 to cope with "group offending").
350 See, e.g., Id. at 16-17 (stating that most statutes adopted in last two decades); see
also 1 THE LAW COMMISSION, A CRIMINAL CODE FOR ENGLAND AND WALES: REPORT AND
DRAFT CRIMINAL CODE BILL 5-6 (1989) (citing reasons to codify).
... See THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 350, at 5-6.
352 See Homicide Act, § 1 (1957) (Eng.) (abrogating felony-murder doctrine). See also
supra note 50.
... THE LAW COMMISSION, REPORT ON CONSPIRACY AND CRIMINAL LAW REFORM
(1976). See also Law Commissions Act, § 1 (1965) (Eng.); see also supra note 50.
3 THE LAW COMMISSION, supra note 353, at 27.
31s See id. at 27-28 (conspiracy count increases "length and complexity of trials,"
"tends to obscure questions of fact vital to a decision on the substantive charges" and
evidence relevant to conspiracy "may have . . . a prejudicial effect on an accused in
relation to" substantive counts).
356 Id. at 30.
317 See Practice Direction, 1977 E.R. 540; 1977 1 W.L.R. 537. The Practice Direction
was promulgated by the presiding judge of the Court of Queen's Bench, which exercises
supervisory jurisdiction over criminal cases. See R. J. WALKER, THE ENGLISH LEGAL
SYSTEM 196-97, 492 (6th ed. 1985).
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[w]here substantive counts meet the justice of the case a
conspiracy count will rarely need to be added .... Where
a Crown Prosecutor is proposing to lay a conspiracy count,
before doing so he should give consideration to the risk of
the trial being lengthy and complicated or otherwise causing
unfairness to defendants. 8
The Code also instructs that "[e]very effort should be made to keep the
number of charges as low as possible," since "[a] multiplicity of charges
imposes an unnecessary burden on the ... Courts ... and often tends to
obscure the essential features of the case. ' 359
As the above quote illustrates, Great Britain retreated from compound
liability at the same time American law was embracing it, which leads one
to wonder why these closely related criminal justice systems reacted so
very differently to this phenomenon. The obvious explanation is America's
experience with organized crime.360 American advocates of compound
liability are likely to point out that Great Britain has not yet encountered
problems with organized crime comparable to those found in the United
States.36' Recent developments in the United Kingdom support this
explanation; a rise in terrorist activity and the anticipated arrival of foreign
gangs have led some to call for adoption of a British version of RICO.362
Others would still agree with a British professor of criminal law who, in
discussing "group offences, ' 363 noted that conspiracy "may be defended
358 Code for Crown Prosecutors, LAW Soc. GAZ., July 23, 1993, p. 2308. See also id.
at 2310 (noting substance of Practice Direction). The Code issued pursuant to § 10 of the
Prosecution of Offenses Act, 1985, is a "public declaration of the principles upon which
the Crown Prosecution Service will exercise its functions." Id. at 2308.
311 Id. at 2309.
360 See supra part II.B.
361 See, e.g., First Super Crime Squad Launched, Reuter Textline-Guardian, March 24,
1993, available in LEXIS, International Library, UK file (new squad to "provide greater
capacity to deal with organised crime"); Michael Jack Launches National Criminal
Intelligence Service, Reuter Textline-Hermes, October 19, 1992, available in LEXIS,
International Library, UK file (stating that criminals"increasingly organised and
sophisticated activities threaten all ordered societies"). See generally supra note 349.
362 See U.S.-Style Law Against IRA Urged, Reuter Textline-Irish Times, November 7,
1990, available in LEXIS, International Library, UK file (recommending a RICO,
"guilt-by-association law" to deal with IRA "racketeering"); Government May Change
the Law to Give Its Agencies More Teeth in the Fight against Paramilitary Rackets in
Northern Ireland, Reuter Textline-Construction News, February 25, 1988, available in
LEXIS, International Library, UK file (same); see also Russian 'riminal Elite " Eyes
London, Reuter Textline-Guardian, March 8, 1993, available in LEXIS, International
Library; Police Fear Japanese Mafia Is Moving into Britain, Reuter Textline-Guardian,
September 28, 1992, available in LEXIS, International Library.
363 See ASHWORTH, supra note 349, at 411.
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as a vital tool against organized crime, but the difficulty is that it bears
oppressively on individuals who are prosecuted .... [T]he same law could
be used against both Mafia leaders and a couple of bungling burglars who
happened to meet in a pub.
'3 4
Whatever the reasons for their divergence, England's attitude toward
compound liability reveals how profoundly American criminal law has
altered in the last century.365 Compound liability is a distinct approach to
criminal liability that alters certain working assumptions of the criminal
justice system.366 Its first successes came in federal law and those
successes, most notably RICO and CCE, led to its acceptance by many of
the states.367
The most remarkable aspect of compound liability's progress in
American law is neither the rapidity nor the permutations of its
achievements; it is that a process which fundamentally alters the shape of
criminal law has so far proceeded without reflection, its revolutionary
nature unremarked by legislators and members of the legal profession. This
inattentiveness is evident in the state statutes analyzed above, if nowhere
else;368 it is clear that few, if any, are the products of careful deliberation
about the significant consequences of a shift to compound liability. These
statutes are reactive artifacts prompted by the perception of threat and/or
by the desire to realize the prosecutorial advantages ensuing from statutes
like RICO and CCE.
Even the proponents of compound liability must agree that an
unacceptable state of affairs exists, and that steps of this magnitude should
be the products of careful deliberation, rather than "quick, rimfire
legislative reflex action. ' 369 Organized crime may pose dangers that can
only be addressed through compound liability, but the consequences of this
shift require that such a decision be made only after thoroughly
investigating the nature and imminence of the perils to be guarded against,
and weighing those perils against the impact of implementing compound
liability, even on a modest scale.
Such a process ostensibly preceded the adoption of RICO and CCE,
but unfortunately, it was strongly influenced by inflated concerns about
"mob" activities, and therefore tended to overlook the unprecedented
3 Id. at 412.
365 See supra part 11.B. 1.
366 See supra parts II.A. and 1I.B.
367 See supra part II.D.
368 See supra part II.D.2; see also supra part II.B.2.c. (cloning of CCE into CFCE).
369 H.R. REP. No. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4648 (additional views of Moss, Dingell, Adams & Eckhardt).
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nature of the liability they introduced.37 ° It may be too late to return the
genie to the lamp or the ills to Pandora's box, but it is not too late to
assess, and perhaps limit, compound liability's role in our criminal justice
system. Such an assessment must distinguish perceived from actual threats,
and not overstate the latter or become caught up in threats of the moment.
In this regard, it is instructive to recall a judge's comments from sixty
years ago:
[S]ociety is confronted today with the shocking and
continuous depredations of organized, desperate, and
merciless gangsters and racketeers .... In the midst of this
chaos of crime, disorder, and defiance of constituted
authority, courts and officers of the law have proven wholly
inadequate for the necessary protection of either life or
property. Times change and we change with them, and the
law must fit the necessities of the times in which we live,
in order to afford adequate protection to society.37'
Judge Land was arguing for a landowner's right to set a spring gun in
his barn to protect his property, even though the spring gun in this case
killed a trespasser who was stealing chickens. 372 He maintained that such
a rule would "relax[ ] the technicalities that usually surround and protect
the felon, and is more in harmony with the temper of the times and the
urgent need of society today for protection against violent and atrocious
crimes. ' 371 Criminal law rejected Judge Land's position because, on
careful reflection, it determined that the danger averted by using spring
guns was not commensurate with the evil resulting from that use.374 The
author hopes that this Article will evoke a similar process of reflection as
to the costs and benefits of compound liability.
370 But see H.R. REP. NO. 1444, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 81-85 (1970), reprinted in 1970
U.S.C.C.A.N. 4566, 4648-52 (additional views of Moss, Dingell, Adams & Eckhardt,
expressing concern about potential abuse of CCE).
171 State v. Plumlee, 149 So. 425, 433 (La. 1933) (Land, J., dissenting) (arguing for
farmer's right to set spring gun to protect barns and outbuildings, even though spring gun
killed intruder who was stealing chickens).
372 Id. at 432.
313 Id. at 433.
374 See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(5) (1985); PERKINS & BOYCE, supra note 42,
at 1158-66.
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